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Uncertainty as to the optimum extent of protection has generally limited the ca-
pacity of law and economics to translate economic theory into coherent doctrinal
recommendations in the realm of copyright. The article explores the relationship
between copyright scope and welfare from a theoretical perspective to develop
a framework for evaluating specific doctrinal recommendations in copyright law.
This analysis of copyright scope establishes that (1) the efficiency of private order-
ing is the key determinant of the ideal level of copyright scope; (2) the complexity
of the welfare-scope relationship is such that we are unlikely to be able to ascertain
a generalizable optimal level of copyright scope – the relationship will clearly be
subject to substantial variation, both within and between industries; (3) doctrinal
recommendations which aim to optimize copyright scope in the abstract but do
not account for the effect of a doctrinal change on transaction costs or uncertainty
are necessarily incomplete.
This article bridges the gap between the traditional law and economics of copy-
right and specific doctrinal analysis, applying the above conclusions as metrics for
assessing doctrinal proposals. The usefulness of applying these metrics in either
rejecting or improving doctrinal recommendations is illustrated with reference to
the predominant law and economics theories of fair use.
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INTRODUCTION 
Uncertainty as to the optimum extent of protection has frequently limited the 
capacity of law and economics to translate economic theory into coherent doctrinal 
recommendations in the realm of copyright.  William Landes and Richard Posner’s 
foundational article, An Economic Analysis of Copyright, seeks to describe the operation of 
copyright by analyzing the extent of copyright protection, broadly defined.1 Although the 
significance of their work is beyond question, there are a number of problems with the single 
variable model which suggest that it is due for reconsideration. The core difficulty with the 
Landes and Posner approach is that knowledge of the optimum level of copyright protection 
does not translate directly into the types of doctrinal decisions that judges have to make.  
The first aspect of the single variable model’s indeterminacy relates to the trade-off 
between scope and duration. From an economic perspective, copyright protection is made 
up of two variables, scope and duration—consequently, conclusions as to optimum 
protection do not suggest which of the infinite number of combinations of scope and 
duration should be adopted.  Assuming that our core interest lies in the economic analysis of 
copyright doctrine, this layer of indeterminacy can be avoided simply by treating duration as 
exogenous.  Treating duration as exogenous begins to address that problem, but only to 
reveal a second layer of indeterminacy relating to the composition of copyright scope.  Just as 
copyright protection is composed of both scope and duration, copyright scope itself 
represents the combined effects of numerous copyright doctrines, such as the idea-
expression distinction, the requirement for substantial similarity and the doctrine of fair use.2  
                                                 
1 William Landes and Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 
(1989).  Landes and Posner have recently expanded on their foundational work in their recent book, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003). Changes and extensions to the Landes and 
Posner model are noted herein to the extent they are relevant.  
2 See note __ infra and accompanying text.  
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Each of these doctrines plays a vital role in determining copyright scope—thus, any 
assessment of the optimum level of scope will also be doctrinally indeterminate, as it too 
could be achieved through an infinite number of combinations of its various components.  
The compositional indeterminacy of copyright scope (and copyright protection more 
generally) means that economic analysis of copyright doctrines must consider both the 
optimal level of copyright scope and the efficiency of individual doctrines used to implement 
that scope. 
The traditional analysis of the optimum level of copyright protection provides a 
framework for understanding the trade-offs between the benefit of monopoly incentives and 
the cost of monopoly pricing.3  In contrast, focusing on copyright scope allows us to focus 
more directly on the effect of copyright on cumulative innovation. The model of the welfare 
effects of copyright scope developed in this article concentrates on the trade-offs between 
initial authors and follow-on authors.4 One clear advantage of modifying the broader notion 
of copyright protection to exclude duration is that it frames economic analysis of copyright 
in the same terms as legal analysis. Copyright scope does not solve the compositional 
ambiguity of the broader model, but its aggregation of doctrinal questions is not completely 
unrealistic.  Resolving copyright disputes frequently involves the simultaneous application of 
a number of different doctrines, but the ultimate question a court has to decide is always the 
same: does the defendant’s use violate the plaintiff’s rights?  
The recent eleventh circuit decision in SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.5 serves as 
an example. In that case, the copyright owner of Gone With the Wind (GWTW), claimed 
                                                 
3 Landes and Posner, supra note 1. 
4 This is not ignored in Landes and Posner’s original work, but nor is it their focus, see Landes and 
Posner, supra note 1, at 325. Mark Lemley has directly addressed the effect of copyright doctrines on sequential 
innovation in a comparison to patent law. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 
75 Tex. L. Rev. 989, 993 (1997). 
5 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 3
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
MATTHEW J. SAG COPYRIGHT SCOPE AND FAIR USE  DRAFT 10/26/05 
that a critical reinterpretation in the form of a new novel, The Wind Done Gone (TWDG), 
was an infringement of copyright. The Court of Appeals found held that TWDG was 
substantially similar to the GWTW because of its extensive use of the characters, settings and 
story line of the original.6  Nonetheless, the court found that the new book was a specific 
criticism of and rejoinder to the perceived racism of the original and was thus protected by 
copyright’s fair use doctrine.7  The court’s decision limited the scope of the copyright 
owner’s rights. But that same decision could have been reached by concluding that the two 
works lacked substantial similarity, rather than relying on fair use.  As illustrated, almost every 
copyright case involves numerous doctrinal issues, but only one outcome.  
This article builds on previous scholarship questioning the scope of copyright,8 and 
extends that analysis into a more systematic inquiry within a law and economics framework.  
Existing scholarship tends to focus on either the public goods nature of information or the 
positive externalities which result from information production,9 whereas this article focuses 
on the relationship between copyright scope and doctrinal efficiency.  
The copyright literature is rife with assertions that copyright is either unnecessary or 
too broad in specific applications, and that various doctrinal levers should be employed to 
                                                 
6 Id. at 1267. 
7 Id. at 1271. 
8 See e.g. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L. Rev 1031 (2005); Brett 
M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 917 (2005); 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the 
Public Domain, 66 L. & Contemp. Probs. 33 (2003); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF 
THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper 
Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 561 (2000); LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First 
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in 
Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management”, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 462 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, 
Intellectual Property and Code, 11 St. John's J. Legal Comm. 635 (1996); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's 
Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 483, 491-92 (1996); Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil 
Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283 (1996). 
9 Building on the work of Lawrence Lessig and many others, Brett Frischmann developes a 
comprehensive theory of the role of uncaptured positive externalities in his recent work in infrastructure. Brett 
M. Frischmann, supra note 8. 
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remedy those excesses. 10 Even if we accept that copyright doctrines should be used as levers 
to more perfectly tailor copyright scope, we still need a mechanism to select which lever to 
pull and to understand when the costs of such tailoring are likely to exceed the benefits.  This 
article bridges the gap between general analysis of the desirable level of copyright scope and 
specific doctrinal recommendations by developing and then applying a set of metrics for 
assessing doctrinal proposals. The usefulness of applying these metrics in either rejecting or 
improving doctrinal recommendations is illustrated with reference to the predominant law 
and economics theories of fair use. 
 Part I reviews the fundamental law and economics accounts of copyright, and 
frames some of the core copyright doctrines in terms of their relationship to copyright scope. 
Part II explores the limits of the traditional single variable model, the advantages of explicitly 
framing economic analysis in terms of copyright scope, and the importance of doctrinal 
efficiency. It then analyses the essential elements of the relationship between scope and 
welfare to develop a law and economics framework for evaluating specific doctrinal 
proposals. Part III then applies that framework to a critique of the current law and 
economics of fair use.   
 
PART I – BACKGROUND: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COPYRIGHT 
This part first introduces the essentials of the law and economics of copyright. 
Traditional law and economics provides a rationale for both the existence of exclusive rights 
                                                 
10 See e.g. Stacey L. Dogan and Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law and Subject Matter Specificity: The Case Of 
Computer Software, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203 (2005) (Noting that a number of courts have significantly 
adapted copyright doctrines to deal with special features of the computer software market. Concluding that 
these adaptations have, by and large, positively sought to strike a balance between incentive and access.)  Lisa P. 
Ramsey, Intellectual Property Rights in Advertising (working paper 2005). Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and 
Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539 (2003) (Finding that because 
“consumer copying does little to reduce the incentives for creation because, for the most part, the creation of 
music is not funded by the sale of copies of that music.”) 
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over information, in the form of copyright, and for the limited nature of those rights.  This 
part then argues that the primary concerns of economic analyses of copyright, the desirability 
and efficiency of copyright, are ultimately issues of copyright scope. This review is 
unnecessary for readers who are familiar with the law and economics of copyright.  
A. The Peculiar Qualities of Information: The Law and Economics of 
Copyright 
The basic dilemma of intellectual property is encapsulated by Stewart Brand’s 
observation that “Information Wants To Be Free. Information also wants to be expensive.”11  
Information wants to be free in the sense that, once produced, information is cheap to copy, 
distribute and recombine.  Information wants to be expensive in the sense that for 
information producers to recover their fixed costs of creation, they need to be able to charge 
more than just the low marginal cost of copying which results from a competitive market. In 
its pure form, information is a public good, meaning that it is both non-excludable and 
nonrivalrous.12 The non-excludable nature of information means that those who produce it 
often find it difficult to keep the benefits to themselves.13  
Consider the following example.  Amy, a budding novelist, plans to write a novel at 
an expected initial cost $100 (called the “cost of expression”).  Amy also expects that, once 
written, it will only cost her $1 to make copies of her novel for distribution.  There are 10 
potential buyers of Amy’s work, each with a different valuation ranging from Bill, for whom 
the novel is worth $20 to Kevin for whom the novel is worth only $11. If Amy was able to 
sell 10 copies of her novel at $11 each, she would be able to recover both her initial cost of 
                                                 
11 STEWART BRAND, THE MEDIA LAB: INVENTING THE FUTURE AT MIT (1987). Information does not 
“want” anything in the cognitive sense, but it does have certain tendencies and characteristics that can be 
usefully summarized by recourse to such animist terms. 
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expression and her marginal cost (the cost of printing each additional volume).  
Unfortunately for Amy she is unlikely to be able to charge that price because once she sells a 
copy to her first customer, Bill, he will also be able to make copies and offer to sell them to 
the remaining customers.  Bill’s cost of expression is zero, since he did not write the novel, 
so Bill can make a profit by selling at any price above his marginal cost of copying.  If Amy 
can’t stop Bill free-riding on her work, she will abandon the idea of becoming a novelist and 
pursue an alternative career instead, a sub-optimal outcome for both Amy and her customers. 
Amy’s story illustrates the classic economic rationale for the creation of exclusive 
rights in information in general and copyright in particular.  Without the legal artifact of 
exclusivity, Amy’s competitors will face a lower average cost of production for her novel 
than she does.14 Consequently, faced with the choice between creating and copying, it makes 
more sense to copy.  To put it another way, in a competitive market, the market price will be 
that of the lowest cost producer, which the author will never be.  As such, without some 
mechanism to appropriate the benefits of their investments, authors and publishers will 
under-invest in the production of information products.15   
The function of copyright protection in resolving this problem in relation to 
expressive works is well understood.16  Copyright rights allow an author to internalize more 
                                                 
14 This is based on the assumption that both parties face the same marginal cost. But even if the 
subsequent producer has a higher marginal cost than the author, he will still have a lower average cost, as long 
as his marginal cost is less than the original author’s marginal cost plus her average fixed costs. 
15 This assumes that the failure of the author to fully capture the benefits of her work distorts her 
allocation of resources. As discussed below, this may not always be the case, see note __ and accompanying 
text. 
16 See MENELL, PETER S. AND SCOTCHMER, SUZANNE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, IN THE 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, A. MITCHELL POLINSKY AND STEVEN SHAVELL (eds), Forthcoming 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=741424.  Note also that government grants of exclusive rights in information are not 
the only solution to this problem. There are in fact a number of proposals to replace intellectual property with 
prizes and government subsidies. See for example, Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus 
Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & Econ. 525 (2001); Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 Vand. L. 
Rev. 115 (2003). 
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of the benefits of her creations; in economic terms, copyright facilitates the internalization of 
a work’s positive externalities and limits free riding.17   
It is important to note the functionalism of this explanation: under this view, the 
exclusive rights vested in authors do not exist by virtue of natural or inherent rights, they are 
simply a means to an end.  Copyright’s constitutional mandate is widely regarded as the 
establishment of incentives, not for the personal enrichment of authors, but as a stimulus to 
their contribution to the total good.18 As the Supreme Court has commented on a number of 
occasions, the constitutional authority for copyright is expressly for the purpose of the 
promotion of science and useful arts, and copyright rewards to authors are means to that 
end.19  
Various regimes of intellectual property address the non-excludability of information 
by making certain classes of information legally exclusive, even though they cannot make 
them actually exclusive. However, the exclusive rights established by regimes such as 
copyright only address one half of the public good problem of information. The other half of 
the public good problem, the nonrivalrous nature of information, must still be accounted for.  
A nonrivalrous good is one for which one person’s use does not affect the value of any other 
person’s use.  For example, while a photographic print is a tangible physical object, it also 
embodies creative expression. If I take the print from your living room, you are deprived of 
the enjoyment of seeing it there; on the other hand, if I merely reproduce the print, you still 
                                                 
17 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. No. 2 (1967). 
(350). A positive externality arises when at least some benefits of an activity spill over to parties not directly 
involved in the activity. In contrast, free riders are actors who obtain the benefits of an activity, but do not share 
its costs. The “free rider problem” is the question of how to prevent free riding from taking place, or at least 
limit its effects. 
18 See e.g. Lemley, supra note 4, at 993. 
19 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (copyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing 
that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in 
the proliferation of knowledge.  The profit motive is the engine that ensures the progress of science.) See also, 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
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have the original and yet I now have one too.  The photo qua object is rivalrous; the photo 
qua artistic expression is non-rivalrous.20   
The non-rivalrous nature of information makes the welfare implications of 
intellectual property different to those of other forms of property: the efficiency of allocating 
property rights in information must be off-set against its resulting under-utilization.21 In 
other words, there is a trade-off between the author’s incentive to produce a work and the 
public’s interest in access to that work.22   
The author’s exclusive rights under copyright law provide a buffer against price 
competition.23 This competitive buffer allows the author to charge higher prices than she 
otherwise would, which in turn has two immediate effects. First, some consumers remain 
willing to purchase the work at a higher price and consequently pay more. Assuming we 
value the welfare of both consumers and authors equally, this is simply a wealth transfer and 
is welfare neutral. Second, those who are unwilling to pay the higher price are forced to go 
without the work in question. Market allocation of scarce recourses to their highest valued 
use is usually welfare enhancing, but for nonrivalrous goods, the exclusion of low value users 
produces a deadweight loss24 because their consumption is not at the expense of another who 
                                                 
20 Note that the artistic expression aspect of the work becomes rivalrous if its value lies in part in its 
uniqueness. It is for this reason that many photographers release a predetermined limited number of prints of 
any given photo.  
21 KENNETH J. ARROW, ECONOMIC WELFARE AND THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR 
INVENTION, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 
614 – 15 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962); Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific 
Research, 67 J. POLIT. ECON. 297, 297 – 306 (1959). 
22 See, Menell and Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 3. (The main defect of intellectual property is that it results 
in a dead weight loss to consumers). 
23 While subsequent authors can offer other works in competition with the author, no one may offer 
the exact same work, or a substantially similar work, to the public without the author’s permission.  It is the 
author’s expectation of the ability to price above marginal cost that induces her investment in production in the 
first place. For these purposes, it is not important whether this competitive buffer should be referred to as a 
“monopoly” or not. See Ariel Katz, IP, Antitrust, and the Presumption of Market Power: Making Sense of Alleged 
Nonsense, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=702462. 
24 Deadweight loss refers to any permanent loss of social welfare. See Shavell, supra note 12, at __. 
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values the good more.  More succinctly, a positive price for a nonrivalrous good necessarily 
implies its underutilization in consumption.25 
Taking both the non-excludable and non-rivalrous nature of information into 
account suggests that there is an inevitable trade-off between efficiency in production and 
efficiency in consumption.26 This is essentially a comparison of dynamic benefits and static 
costs.27 Copyright has dynamic benefits in that it creates incentives to invest in the creation 
of new intellectual and creative works. Copyright has static costs comprised of the consumer 
deadweight loss resulting from higher prices, the concentration of market power, and 
possible stifling of alternative points of view. In the classic model, the optimal assignment of 
copyright rights is determined by a balance the dynamic incentives against static deadweight 
losses.28  More recently, scholars have begun to question whether this simple trade-off 
between access and incentives describes the full effects of intellectual property. 29 This article 
offers one such challenge to the traditional model by emphasizing the centrality of copyright 
scope and the importance of doctrinal efficiency.   
B. The Elements of Copyright Scope  
In contrast to copyright duration, which dictates the period in which any copyright 
rights exist, copyright scope refers to the extent of the rights of the copyright owner.  Like 
duration, copyright scope has greatly expanded over time, but with less uniformity.  Since the 
statute of Anne in 1710, copyright laws in both England and the U.S. have given authors the 
                                                 
25 Arrow, supra note 21, at 617. A view echoed by the U.S. Supreme Court: “[Copyright requires] a 
difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings 
and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and 
commerce on the other hand.” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
26 Arrow, supra note 21. 
27 Id., at 618; Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent 
Law, 5 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 29–41 (1991); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW 36 – 50 (5th ed. 1998). 
28 Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 326. 
29 Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decision Architectures, 92 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 
(forthcoming 2006). Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=726561.  
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exclusive right to reproduce their works for a limited period of time.  Until the mid-1800s, 
however, copyright infringement was limited to verbatim reproduction, or replication with 
only very minor changes that were judged to have been made merely to evade the copyright 
owner’s rights.30  In other words copyright scope was extremely narrow. For example, in the 
1853 case of Stowe v. Thomas, it was held that a dramatization of the novel Uncle Tom's Cabin 
did not infringe the author’s rights in the novel.31 Subsequently, copyright scope has greatly 
expanded to the point where broad conceptual similarities have been found sufficient to 
sustain a finding of infringement.32 Clearly, the Stowe case would be decided differently 
today.33    
Copyright scope has both a formal legal dimension and an economic dimension.34 In 
formal legal terms, scope depends on (i) the extent to which facts and ideas are not 
copyrightable, (ii) the extent of similarity required to make non-literal copying actionable, (iii) 
the extent to which similarity is accepted as evidence of actual copying and (iv) the extent of 
fair use.35  In economic terms, scope can be envisaged spatially, as the distance between the 
author’s work and the closest non-infringing substitute.36 Alternatively, scope can be thought 
                                                 
30. Oren Bracha, From Privilege To Print To Ownership Of Works: The Transformation Of American Copyright 
Law 1790–1909 (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University Law School) (on file with author) at 
36.  
31 Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 208 (No. 13,514) (CC ED Pa. 1853). 
32 See, e.g. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th 
Cir., 1977); Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958 (8th Cir., 2005); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. 
Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 & n.25 (3d Cir. 1986). 
33 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 245-246 (1990). 
34 Menell and Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 14. (Noting that legal doctrines do not map directly onto 
the economic concepts of breadth.) 
35 The extent of secondary liability should probably also be considered to be a fundamental 
determinant of copyright scope because it allows the copyright owner to control new technologies of 
dissemination and also allows copyright owners to leverage their copyrights into non-copyright markets.  This 
subject deserves more complete consideration than this article permits. Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as 
Innovation Policy (working paper). One could also include the doctrines of originality, functionality and scenes a 
faire as separate determinants of copyright scope, although these are not addressed here. See also Menell and 
Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 13; Shavell, supra note 12, at 157–159. (Copyright scope determined by similarity, 
access, fair use and the derivative works doctrine). 
36 See Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 113 
(1990). See also, Menell and Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 14; Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization 
 11
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
MATTHEW J. SAG COPYRIGHT SCOPE AND FAIR USE  DRAFT 10/26/05 
of as determining the cost of entry into the market occupied by the copyrighted work.37 Both 
of these economic conceptions of scope assume compliance with the law. A more 
complicated question is how to account for the availability of both legal and illegal substitutes 
where a substantial body of consumers assigns only a very small discount for a product’s 
illegality. 
The congruence of the legal and economic dimensions of copyright scope is highly 
contingent: in some cases narrow legal rights give rise to broad economic power; in others, 
even broad legal rights provide little insulation from competition. Computer software 
illustrates both these points: protection of object code from literal copying provides a very 
effective shield against piracy; nonetheless, it does not protect any of the functionality of a 
program, and so offers very little advantage against would-be imitators.  
The key doctrines of copyright are best understood as expanding and limiting the 
scope of copyright protection.  The remainder of this section reviews the elements of 
copyright scope individually from a law and economics perspective.   
1. The idea-expression distinction 
The first element of copyright scope is the varying robustness with which courts 
police the idea expression distinction.  At its core, the idea expression distinction holds that 
“no author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates.”38 As the Supreme Court has 
recently commented, copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or information 
                                                                                                                                                  
Approach To Copyright Law, 46 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 33 (2004) (applying the Hotelling and Salop economic 
models of product differentiation to copyright); Yoo, supra note 38 (also applying economic models of product 
differentiation to copyright, but with different conclusions). See generally Jean Tirole, THE THEORY OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1998) at 96 – 131. 
37 Nancy T. Gallini, Patent Policy and Costly Imitation, 23 RAND J. ECON. 52 (1992). See also, Menell and 
Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 14. 
38 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) 
(In no case does copyright protection for an original work of  authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, 
system, method of  operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of  the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.) 
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contained in an author’s work, it merely protects the expression of those ideas and 
information.39   
The economic rationale for the idea expression distinction is that granting exclusive 
rights to the abstract ideas contained in a work would significantly increase both the cost of 
expression and the costs of administering copyright. These costs would exceed the incentive 
value of allowing broader rights over ideas for at least four reasons.  
First, copyright protection of ideas raises the cost of expression for second 
generation authors by compelling them to either, (i) develop their own ideas, (ii) license ideas 
from copyright owners, (iii) search for ideas in the public domain or (iv) pursue alternative 
careers.40 The impact on the cost of expression would depend on the level of abstractness of 
the idea in question. The theoretical possibility of copyright in very abstract ideas is unlikely 
to translate into a significant cost to future authors because of the large number of basic 
ideas already in the public domain; for example, Shakespeare seems to have covered all 
possible variations of the boy-meets-girl story. But at a slightly lower level of abstraction, 
there is a real danger that copyright protection of ideas would stymie the efforts of the next 
generation of authors and create an ‘ideas thicket’ of overlapping rights to be cleared.41    
Second, the protection of ideas would significantly increase the administrative costs 
of copyright. “Courts would have to define each idea, set its boundaries, determine its 
overlap with other ideas, and, most difficult of all, identify the idea in the work of the alleged 
                                                 
39 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–219 (2003). See also, Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880) 
(accounting form used to record information rather than to explain information not eligible for copyright 
protection).  
40 This article uses the term “first generation author” to refer to the producer of an original work, and 
“second generation author” to refer to an author who combines new material with one or a number of existing 
works to make a new work. Clearly, any given author may be a first generation author in relation to her 
successors, but a second generation author in relation to her predecessors.  
41 Similar to a “patent thicket” whereby a tangle of overlapping upstream patent rights hinders the 
efficient development of downstream products because those seeking to commercialize a new technology must 
obtain licenses from multiple patentees. See, Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, 
and Standard-Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL'Y AND THE ECON. 6-8 (2001), at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf.  
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infringer.”42 Copyright protection of ideas would also increase the difficulty of differentiating 
infringement from independent discovery, discussed in more detail below.   
Third, the extent to which the copyright protection of ideas would lead to any 
additional incentive to create is highly questionable. Basic ideas are rarely a product in 
themselves.  No one pays $12 to be told to imagine that a family of children helps a stranded 
alien return home, but a finished product containing the artful expression of that same plot 
may be worth millions in the form of a movie, film or video game.43 Ideas typically represent 
a small fraction of the cost of their expression;44 consequently extending copyright protection 
further back along the continuum from expression to ideas is unlikely to have a significant 
incentive advantage.  Such protection may accelerate development of “new” ideas but it is 
also likely to impede their further development. Another reason to doubt the incentive 
effects of copyright protection in ideas is simply that very few ideas are actually new.  The 
greater the level of abstraction protected, the more likely this is to be true. 
Fourth, copyright protection of ideas would encourage rent seeking and the diversion 
of resources from execution to initiation of new works.45  If there are substantial rewards to 
be had merely for conceiving of basic ideas, it might be more attractive to act as a kind of 
plot-speculator, than working out the full expression of an idea.  Plot-speculators could then 
extract licensing fees from those people who actually made finished expressive products. For 
these reasons, the strength of the idea expression distinction is a key determinant of 
copyright scope.  
                                                 
42 Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 349. 
43 The film E.T.: the Extra-Terrestrial was at one point the highest grossing film of all time. 
44 Although there are counter-examples where the idea and the expression are essentially merged such 
as Newton’s Third Law of Motion, or Einstein’s Theory of General Relativity.  
45 Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 349. An author by the name of Ashleigh Brilliant has been 
astonishingly successful at this kind of rent seeking. Brilliant “coined” 7500 aphorisms and mounted more than 
a hundred successful copyright infringement suits. See Michael Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-
Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV 509, 518 (2003). 
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2. Substantial similarity 
The requirement of substantial similarity is the second element of copyright scope 
and is closely related to, but distinct from, the idea expression distinction.  Copyright 
infringement requires both actual copying of the original work and that the subsequent work 
be substantial similar to that work.46   
Like many other areas of copyright law, the substantial similarity requirement 
presents courts with a difficult line-drawing exercise.47 As Judge Learned Hand explained in 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., “[i]t is of course essential to any protection of literary 
property, whether at common-law or under the statute, that the right cannot be limited 
literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations. That has never 
been the law, but, as soon as literal appropriation ceases to be the test, the whole matter is 
necessarily at large …”48 In many cases, courts simply apply an ordinary observer test to 
determine substantial similarity.  For example, the ninth circuit has held that two works “are 
substantially similar where the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, 
would be disposed to overlook them, and regard the aesthetic appeal of the two works as the 
same.”49  However, because substantial similarity only applies to protectable expression and 
not the works as a whole, some courts have attempted a more rigorous process of 
dissection.50   
                                                 
46 Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 2003) (Even where the fact of copying is 
conceded, no legal consequences will follow from that fact unless the copying is substantial.) 
47 As Judge Learned Hand commented, the line that separates substantial form insubstantial will always 
seem arbitrary, wherever it is drawn. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930).  See 
also Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (the test for infringement 
of a copyright is of necessity vague.) 
48 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir., 1930) 
49 Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotes and 
citations omitted) 
50 Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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Substantial similarity also places a key limit on the scope of the copyright owner’s 
derivative rights.51 The exclusive right to make derivative works is broad: it includes the right 
to translate, abridge or dramatize a pre-existing works, just to name a few. Nonetheless, the 
derivative right remains subject to the requirement of substantial similarity.52  
Both the idea expression distinction and substantial similarity requirement present 
courts with difficult line drawing exercises. What is right level of abstraction? What should be 
excluded from a substantial similarity inquiry? How much similarity is too much? How far 
should the right to control derivative works be extended? From the perspective of law and 
economics, these questions should be resolved with consideration of the costs and benefits 
of increasing (or decreasing) copyright scope in mind. If copyright scope is too broad, 
subsequent authors will be limited in their freedom to create their own works and society will 
not have access to adequate substitutes for the original work. On the other hand, if copyright 
scope is too narrow, substitutes for the original author’s work would be too freely available, 
and her incentives will be reduced.   
3. Actual copying 
The third element of copyright scope concerns the application of the requirement for 
actual copying as a prerequisite to liability for infringement. There are at least two economic 
                                                 
51 Section 106(2). Section 101 defines a derivative work as follows: “A derivative work is a work based 
upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, 
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” 
52 Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (a work is not derivative unless it has 
been substantially copied from the prior work). See also 1 Melvin B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on 
Copyright 3.01 at 3-3 (2002).  Many have commented that it is hard to see what the derivative right in section 
106(2) adds to the reproduction right in section 106(1) of the Copyright Act. Nimmer, Id. See also, Lemley, The 
Economics of Improvement, supra note 4, at 1017–1018. Lemley offers three explanations for the separate treatment 
of derivatives: (i) section 106(2) may extend the exclusive right to reproduce a work “in copies” to any 
reproduction, whether fixed in a tangible medium of expression or not; (ii) the subsection may limit a 
consumer’s ability to alter or transform their own copy of the work, notwithstanding the first sale doctrine; and 
(iii) in conjunction with section 103, the separate articulation of the derivative right may allow copyright owners 
to protect a chain of works more effectively. For example, “Disney might protect a book, a script derived from 
that book, a movie made from the script, and stuffed animals derived from the movie, even though the stuffed 
animals have no resemblance to anything described in the original book.” Id. 
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justifications for the requirement of actual copying. The first is that, given the improbability 
of accidental replication of another’s expression, the additional incentive effect of finding the 
second author liable in that unlikely event is presumably equally low.53 The second reason is 
that, when there is independent creation, there is no free riding on the work of the original 
author. If two equally efficient authors independently create the same work, they each face 
the same cost of expression and the same average cost. The first author suffers from the 
market entry of the second, but only in the same fashion as a seller in any other type of 
market place suffers from competition.   
Although copyright infringement requires actual copying as a matter of law, it is often 
proven circumstantially.  A copyright plaintiff may prove a defendant’s copying by showing 
that (i) the defendant had access to the plaintiff's copyrighted work and (ii) that defendant’s 
work is substantially similar to the plaintiff's copyrightable material.54 For this reason, the 
requirement of actual copying is closely linked to the question of substantial similarity, often 
muddlingly so.  The similarity that makes copying actionable and the similarity that evidences 
copying in the first place should be distinct legal concepts; nonetheless, they are often mixed 
together.55  Nevertheless, the actual copying requirement is a distinct element of copyright 
scope. Whereas substantial similarity affects scope by delineating the extent to which similar 
substitutes can exist in the market, the requirement of actual copying affects scope by 
rewarding independent creation regardless of the extent of similarity. 
                                                 
53 Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 345. Although, as Douglas Adams observed in The Hitchhiker’s 
Guide to the Galaxy, an infinite number of monkeys typing at random, for an infinite period of time, will 
eventually produce complete works of William Shakespeare. Nonetheless, monkeys are not known to be 
especially litigious. 
54 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir., 1946). 
55 See, Lunney, Reexamining, supra note 8. 
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4. Fair use 
The fourth element of copyright scope is the doctrine of fair use. Section 107 of the 
Copyright Act states that “the fair use of a copyrighted work is not an infringement of 
copyright.”56  Moving beyond a circular definition of fair use is surprisingly difficult. The fair 
use doctrine operates in a contextual fashion as a negative definition: if something is fair use, 
it is not copyright infringement.57 Time-shifting broadcast television for later viewing,58 
copying part of a work in order to make a parody of it,59 making thumbnail versions of 
images available on the internet as part of a picture based search engine,60 and reverse 
engineering computer software,61 are all examples of fair use.  These diverse fact patterns 
have at least two points in common: first, in each case the defendant reproduced a substantial 
part (or all) of the original work, such that there was no question of copying, substantial 
similarity or the idea expression distinction; second, the nature of the activity of the 
defendant was such that their copying was held to be non-infringing.62 These cases and many 
others illustrate a more general point: the rights of copyright owners may be broadly 
expressed, but they are not absolute. 
                                                 
56 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2005). The statutory codification of  the fair use doctrine requires courts to consider 
four factors in determining whether a use is fair: (1) the purpose and character of  the use; (2) the nature of  the 
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of  the portion taken; and (4) the effect of  the use upon the 
potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work. Id.  
57 Both the statutory definition of fair use (a use that is not a violation of copyright) and the express 
limitation of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner (subject to section 107 (fair use)) indicate that “fair use 
should be considered an affirmative right… , rather than merely an affirmative defense.” SunTrust Bank v. 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 
1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996). However, fair use is commonly referred to an affirmative defense because of 
the procedural necessity that the specifics of the fair use claim be raised by the defendant. See Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).  
58 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
59 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
60 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
61 Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000). 
62 The question in Sony, was whether the maker of the video cassette recorder was liable for the 
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Fair use affects copyright scope by limiting the rights of copyright owners in some 
situations. Fair use encapsulates a judgment that in certain contexts, any reduction in a first 
generation author’s incentive to produce original works that allowing an unauthorized use 
may cause, is outweighed by the benefits of that access. However, fair use has arguably 
served to protect the rights of copyright owners by enabling the otherwise broad scope and 
duration of their rights embodied in the current Copyright Act.63  The predominant law and 
economics theories of fair use are examined in detail in Part III.   
The purpose of this Part was acquaint the reader with some of the more basic 
concepts of the law and economics of copyright, and also to illustrate how copyright’s core 
doctrines can be reframed in terms of their relationship to copyright scope. These concepts 
provide the foundation for Part II, which explores the limits of the traditional single variable 
model, the advantages of explicitly framing economic analysis in terms of copyright scope, 
and the importance of doctrinal efficiency. Part II also analyses the essential elements of the 
relationship between scope and welfare to develop a law and economics framework for 
evaluating specific doctrinal proposals. 
 
PART II – COPYRIGHT SCOPE AND DOCTRINAL EFFICIENCY 
A. The limits of the single variable model  
Landes and Posner’s article, An Economic Analysis of Copyright, describes the operation 
of copyright by analyzing the extent of copyright protection, broadly defined.  The Landes 
and Posner framework has been very influential, but the limits of their analysis discussed in 
                                                 
63 See Matthew J. Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 11 
MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 381 (2005). 
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this article suggest that some revision of the classic model is due.64 The core difficulty with 
the Landes and Posner approach is that knowledge of the optimum level of copyright 
protection does not translate directly into the types of doctrinal decisions that judges have to 
make.65     
The traditional single variable model’s focus on overall copyright reward comes at the 
cost of significant indeterminacy.  The Landes and Posner model treats copyright protection 
as a single variable (Z) and examines the relationship between Z, the cost of producing 
copyrightable works, and the number of works produced.66  Landes and Posner developed 
their model as a vehicle through which to examine the field of copyright as a whole from an 
economic standpoint, and to see to what extent copyright law could be explained as a means 
for promoting the efficient allocation of resources.67  In that context, the model serves its 
purpose, but as a vehicle for translating economic analysis into doctrinal recommendations, 
the model is limited by its own generality.68  
The aggregation of scope and duration into a single variable makes analysis of the 
level of copyright protection doctrinally indeterminate.  From an economic perspective, 
                                                 
64 This is not the first article to make this suggestion. For example, Glynn Lunney suggests that 
incentive access paradigm justifies any level of copyright protection because benefits of incentive and costs of 
limiting access oppose each other with equal force. Lunney, Reexamining, supra note 8, 486 (1996), See also, 
Yoo, supra note 38, at 222. 
65 This is the same observation that Merges and Nelson made with respect to patent law 15 years ago, 
but its application to copyright has rarely been systematically pursued. Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, 
On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 875 (1990). Mark Lemley’s comparison of the 
treatment of incremental innovation in patent and copyright comes closest. See Lemley, Economics of 
Improvement, supra note __.   
66 Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 325. 
67 Id., at 325.  
68 Landes and Posner do undertake a significant normative analysis of copyright doctrine, but that 
analysis is largely disconnected from their model. Additionally, the author’s doctrinal recommendations are 
primarily in the form of ex post justifications for existing doctrines. Id., at 344 – 363. See James Boyle, A Theory of 
Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 Calif. L. Rev. 1413, 1447 (1992) (“Landes 
and Posner describe copyright as constructed by the tension between the need to grant legally protected 
interests to authors in order to motivate them and the need to limit the rights of authors so as to allow future 
creators legal access to the raw materials they need. This seems reasonable enough, but it also leaves them 
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copyright protection can be divided into two distinct variables: the scope of rights and their 
duration. In this respect, conclusions regarding the optimum level of protection do not 
suggest which of the infinite number of combinations of scope and duration should be 
adopted.   
Assuming that our core interest lies in the economic analysis of individual copyright 
doctrines,69 this layer of indeterminacy can be avoided simply by treating duration as 
exogenous.  Although duration is clearly an important component of the author’s expected 
reward, leaving duration out of the model has very little distorting effect because of the 
extraordinary length of modern copyright. The first American Copyright Act (1790) 
established a meager copyright term of only 14 years from the date of a work’s publication; 
that term was renewable for an additional 14 years if the author survived the first term.70  
Since that time, the duration of copyright protection has steadily expanded. It was extended 
to 42 years in 1831,71 and again to 56 years in 1909.72 In 1976, Congress both extended the 
term of copyright and changed the method for its calculation. For the works of identified 
natural persons, the 1976 Act extended copyright term from the moment of the work’s 
creation until 50 years after the author’s death.73  For anonymous works, pseudonymous 
works, and works made for hire, the 1976 Act provided a term of 75 years from publication 
or 100 years from creation, whichever expired first.74 In 1988, Congress enacted the Sonny 
                                                 
69 Which is not the primary purpose for which Landes and Posner designed their model. Landes and 
Posner, supra note 1, at 325. 
70 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790 Act). 
71 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439 (1831 Act) (28 years from publication, 
renewable for an additional 14 years). 
72 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 23-24, 35 Stat. 1080-1081 (1909 Act). (28 years from publication, 
renewable for an additional 28 years). 
73 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2005). 
74 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2005). 
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Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) which extended the terms of all existing and 
future copyrights by a further 20 years.75  
The justification for these extensions is suspect from an economic perspective, 
particularly the most recent one affected by the CTEA. The low probability that a work will 
remain commercially valuable three quarters of a century (or more) after its publication,  
combined with standard assumptions about the time value of money, render the added 
incentive provided by the CTEA “virtually worthless.”76 Nonetheless, it seems likely that the 
change from a 75 year term to a 95 year term (as in the case of a work made for hire) may 
not be that significant from an ex ante perspective. One way to put the current duration of 
copyright into perspective is to contrast its net present value to that of perpetual copyright. 
According to the economists’ brief in Eldred,77 the copyright terms provided by the CTEA 
are equal to 99.8% of the value of a perpetual copyright. At first glance this seems 
remarkable, the term of copyright is now so long that it is barely distinguishable from infinity. 
But, note that on the same calculations, the terms established under the 1976 Act were equal 
to 99.4% of the value of a perpetual copyright.78  Arguably, both these terms are too long, 
but even if one takes that view, it is hard to see that a term equal to 99.8% of perpetual 
copyright is significantly more problematic than one equal to 99.4%, or perpetual copyright.  
                                                 
75 For works created by identified natural persons, the term now lasts from creation until 70 years after 
the author’s death, see 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2005). For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works 
made for hire, the term is 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation, whichever expires first, 17 
U.S.C. § 302(c) (2005). 
76 Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
2187, 2236-37 (2000) (describing the CTEA extension as “virtually worthless” from an incentive perspective, 
and “a classic instance of almost pure rent-seeking legislation.”). See also, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 255 
(U.S., 2003) (Justice Breyer, dissenting); George A. Akerlof et. al. – Brief of Amici Curiae George A. Akerlof et 
al., at 2, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002) (No. 01-618) (term extension offers less than a 1% increase in 
the net present value of the pre 1998 term), available at 
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/amici/economists.pdf. 
77 Akerlof, Id.  
78 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 210 (2003). 
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Moreover, the “effective copyright life”79of a work may be unrelated to its statutory life 
because the market for most copyright works fades long before the end of their term. Ex 
ante, it is copyright scope that largely determines a work’s expected “effective copyright 
life.”80  
Treating duration as exogenous to economic models of copyright is also expedient 
given that duration appears to be determined solely with reference to political criteria, not 
social welfare criteria.81 After Eldred, it is very clear that no matter how ill-conceived the 
recent CTEA might have been, nothing written by economists or law professors is likely to 
change the clear congressional policy in favor of long (and expanding) copyright terms.  It is 
equally clear that efforts to limit Congressional power to implement that policy through 
judicial review have come to naught. In 2003 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of the CTEA and rejected the petitioners’ argument that the term extension violated the 
“limited times” prescription of the Copyright Clause.82  
The appropriate combination of duration and scope in copyright is an interesting 
intellectual puzzle, but for the reasons given above, copyright scope should be the focus of 
our analysis, taking the current (extraordinarily long) duration as given.83  
                                                 
79 Adapting from O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse’s notion of “effective patent life.” See, 
O'Donoghue, T., S. Scotchmer and J.F. Thisse, Patent Breadth, Patent Life and the Pace of Technological Progress, 7 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 1 (1998).  
80 See discussion in Menell and Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 24 – 25.  Landes and Posner have recently 
argued in favor of a system of indefinitely renewable copyright protection because of the possibility that 
prominent works might be subject to congestion externalities if they were to enter the public domain upon the 
expiration of copyright. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 471, 475 (2003).  
81 This is the predominant view, there are exceptions. See e.g. Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis, 
Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh In On Copyright: The Role Of Theory, Empirics, And Network Effects, 18 HARV. J. 
LAW & TEC 435 (2005). 
82 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
83 This analysis does not take into account the economic function that formalities once had in 
copyright. See, Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004). 
 23
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
MATTHEW J. SAG COPYRIGHT SCOPE AND FAIR USE  DRAFT 10/26/05 
B. Copyright scope as a framework for economic analysis 
As a tool of economic analysis, copyright scope has both distinct advantages and 
disadvantages compared to the more general notion of copyright protection. The primary 
strength of the approach is that it does not require knowledge of the optimum trade-off 
between the incentives created by copyright and dead-weight loss of exclusion.84 As such, it 
allows us to focus more directly on the effect of copyright on cumulative innovation.85  The 
weakness of the model is that there are some important questions relating to the copyright 
system as a whole that cannot be addressed without considering the effect of the duration of 
rights.  But, for the reasons discussed above, treating duration as exogenous has very little 
distorting effect in application.   
Framing economic analysis in terms of scope is useful because it focuses on the 
effect of the law on cumulative innovation.  The case for framing economic analysis in terms 
of copyright scope echoes Robert Merges and Richard Nelson’s discussion of scope in the 
context of patent law.86 Merges and Nelson identify the scope of property rights as a crucial 
question for patent law.87  They note that conventional economic analysis stresses the 
importance of assigning property rights to mitigate problems relating to externalities but 
overlooks the question of how broad property rights should be.88  Merges and Nelson argue 
                                                 
84 See Lunney, supra note__. 
85  
86 Merges and Nelson, supra note 65, at 875. For a summary of the literature on patent scope see 
Menell and Scotchmer, supra note, 3, at 13 – 16; Note that conclusions regarding patent scope may not directly 
translate to copyright because the different nature of the exclusive rights involved.  In particular, patent law 
allows “blocking patents” whereby a second generation inventor can patent her improvements to the original 
inventor’s device, even if she still needs a license from the original inventor to practice the improved invention. 
In contrast, under copyright law, the author of an unauthorized derivative work has no rights with respect to 
her creation. See, Lemley, Economics, supra note 8, at 991–992. 
87 Merges and Nelson, supra note 65, at 875. 
88 Id. The appropriate scope of copyright is a topic that has largely been outside the law and economics 
framework. See, e.g. Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 8; Boyle, Enclosure supra note 8; Lessig, The Future of 
Ideas, supra note 8; Benkler, From Consumers to Users, supra note 8; Lessig, Code, supra note 8; Benkler, Free as 
the Air, supra note 8 (1999); Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, supra note 8; Netanel, supra note 8. There are 
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that “although property rights assignments can make development of an asset more efficient, 
the scope of rights is crucial. Property rights that are too narrow will not provide enough 
incentive to develop the asset, while overly broad rights will preempt too many competitive 
development efforts.”89  
Copyright scope controls the level of competition facing the copyright owner in both 
first and second generation products.  The traditional incentive access paradigm concentrates 
on competition in the first generation market, but in many cases the more interesting 
questions for copyright relate to the second generation market where first generation 
products are inputs for later stage products.90 Copyright scope determines the ability of rival 
producers to offer substitutes for the product of the original author, thus the ability to price 
over marginal cost.  In contrast, copyright duration does not affect the level of competition 
during the term; it only determines when the market reverts to free competition. So, while 
scope is a question of degree, duration is all or nothing.  One implication is that, whereas 
even small changes in copyright scope affect every market participant, only works near the 
end of their term of copyright protection are likely to be affected by a change in duration.91   
                                                                                                                                                  
notable exceptions, see e.g. Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 8; Frischmann, supra note 8; Abramowicz, supra note 
36; Yoo, supra note 38; Cohen, supra note 8; Lunney, Reexamining, supra note 8. 
89 Merges and Nelson, supra note 65, at 875. 
90 Brett Frischmann’s “infrastructure theory” argues that certain resources generate value when used as 
inputs into a wide range of productive processes and that the outputs from these processes are often public and 
non-market goods that generate positive externalities. Accordingly, Frischmann sees that there is broad case to 
be made for “open access” within a law and economics framework.  Frischmann, supra note 8. The importance 
of copyrighted works as inputs for later stage products is also a key concern of scholars working outside the law 
and economics framework, see supra note 88. 
91 The application of copyright scope to questions relating to complete copies requires some 
clarification. Complete copies generally present easy cases for copyright law.  For simple acts of piracy, 
copyright duration is the only significant question. Nonetheless, the fair use doctrine establishes a number of 
circumstances where even a complete copy will not infringe the author’s rights. Generally these copies are either 
for an intermediate use, such as reverse engineering computer software – see Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. 
Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000); a non-commercial use, such as time-shifting broadcast 
television, see Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) – or releasing 
information in the public interest –  see Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (C.D. Cal. 
2004). But not always, see Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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 C.  The Welfare Effects of Changes in Copyright Scope  
This section explores the relationship between copyright scope and welfare from a 
theoretical perspective. 92 Establishing what is known and what is unknown about that 
relationship provides a framework for evaluating specific doctrinal recommendations in 
copyright law.  This method is useful given the number and variety of recommendations that 
implicitly rely on some underlying theory the scope-welfare relationship.93 The framework 
developed in this article does not provide a basis for evaluating individual cases; rather it 
establishes a set of metrics or benchmarks by which to assess specific doctrinal 
recommendations. The usefulness of applying these metrics in either rejecting or improving 
doctrinal recommendations is illustrated in Part III of this article with reference to the 
predominant law and economics theories of fair use.  
This section develops a model of the welfare effects of a change in copyright scope in 
four stages. First, it begins with a simple intuitive model of the welfare effects of a change in 
copyright scope by imagining the consequences of the opposing extremes of copyright 
scope: S0 such that only identical works are capable of infringement, and S∞ such that even 
the slightest similarity rendered liability for infringement.  This simple model leads to the 
proposition that the welfare/scope curve is convex, such that the optimum level of copyright 
scope is more than S0, but less than S∞.   
The second stage considers an entirely different model premised on efficient private 
ordering, i.e. the effective market reallocation of rights through licensing or the consolidation 
of production into firms. Essentially, the efficient private ordering model rejects the 
                                                 
92 See Shavell, supra note 12, at 597.  The standard economic definition of social welfare is the sum of 
all individual utilities, but determining which factors contribute to welfare in the context of copyright is difficult. 
For example, one can not simply assume that all books are of equal value, all movies are of equal value, or even 
that the average value of books and movies are the same.  Furthermore, in the digital age there is no real scarcity 
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conclusion that increasing copyright scope is ever likely to increase the cost of expression 
more than it increases the incentive effect. Those advocating an efficient private ordering 
model acknowledge that an increase in copyright scope may raise the cost of expression for 
second generation authors, but they argue that those costs will, on average, be off-set by their 
increased prospective reward.94   
The third stage attempts to reconcile the opposing views presented in stages one and 
two. The conclusion of the third stage is that the prospect of private ordering does change 
the likely welfare effects of an increase in copyright scope, but that there remains an optimal 
level of copyright scope that is less than the maximum. Many scholars have reached the same 
conclusion observationally.95  
The fourth and final stage adds further complexity by arguing that there is no one 
welfare-scope relationship, rather different industries, markets, and modes of production will 
experience different welfare-scope relationships simultaneously. Empirical assessment of the 
likely welfare effects of a change in copyright scope is rendered extremely difficult by the 
indeterminacy of copyright scope and the likelihood of inter-industry effects. This suggests 
that attempts to calibrate individual copyright doctrines to optimize scope may be more 
difficult than previously acknowledged.  
                                                 
94 See, e.g. Menell and Scotchmer, supra note 16, 23 – 24; Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The 
Impact Of Automated Rights Management On Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C.L. REV. 557, 584 (1998); I. Trotter 
Hardy, Property in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 217. Note that none of these scholars would literally advocate 
an infinite degree of copyright scope. At the most extreme they might argue that any feasible increase in scope 
is likely to be a net positive, and even that may be overstating their positions. Nonetheless, as a theoretical 
exercise it is important to begin with exploring the limits of the abstract proposition.  
95 E.g. Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, supra note 8, at 638 (Arguing that sufficient incentive is 
something less than perfect control); Cohen, supra note 8, at 514 (“Incentives to create and limits on 
author/owner control are not mutually exclusive, as the argument from redistribution might lead one to think. 
Rather, they are complementary means for triangulating “progress.” The trick is to balance the two, and neither 
assertions about redistribution nor formulaic prescriptions for maximizing allocative efficiency will help us.) 
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Stage 1: The simple model 
The welfare effects of an increase in copyright scope are uncertain in the abstract. 
Like copyright protection more generally, any change in copyright scope will have effects on 
(i) the author’s potential reward for the production of a work, (ii) the author’s cost of 
expression and (iii) the administrative costs of the copyright system.  
In isolation, the prospect of an increased reward should increase the production of 
copyrighted works. However, the same expansion of copyright scope may also increase the 
author’s cost of expression. For example, faced with a legal regime that required brief 
quotations to be licensed, some authors would expend resources on attaining such licenses, 
whereas other would find it more economical to avoid that cost by summarizing instead of 
quoting. In either case, such a regime increases the cost of expression for second generation 
authors. An expansion of copyright scope might also increase the administrative costs of the 
copyright system, depending on the nature of the rule in question.  For example, a rule that 
requires case by case adjudication would tend to cause more cases to be litigated and would 
thus increase state expenditure on judges, court houses etc.96 The net effect of increasing 
copyright scope will depend on whether the costs of expansion outweigh the benefits, or 
vice-versa.   
Assume for the moment that the scope of copyright was so narrow as to permit all 
but virtually identical reproduction of the original work by a second generation author. In 
that case, an expansion of copyright scope would almost certainly be welfare improving, as 
the positive effects of increased incentives would dominate any concerns as to the increased 
cost of expression. Works remain protected from outright piracy even at relatively high 
thresholds of substantial similarity; as that level falls (i.e. less similarity is required to find a 
                                                 
96 This follows from the Priest-Kline model the selection of disputes for litigation. [cite] 
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work infringing), the extent to which competitors must differentiate their products from the 
work of the original author increases. Increasing copyright scope is welfare improving up to 
the point where the costs of expansion (increasing the cost of expression and administrative 
costs) outweigh the benefits of increased incentives.   
Figure 1 represents the intuition that there is some ideal or maximally efficient scope 
of copyright. It represents welfare on the vertical axis and scope on the horizontal axis. The 
welfare-scope curve is convex, such that there exists a point S*, the level of scope at which 
welfare is maximized.  An increase in scope from Sqo to S* will be welfare improving, but any 
further increase (from S* to Sqp) has the reverse effect, as the difficulty of creating new works 
while incorporating less and less of existing works begins to overwhelm the incentive effects.  








This representation of the welfare effects of copyright scope does not indicate 
whether the current level of S is in fact greater than or less than S*. Views on this question 
sharply diverge. Paul Goldstein neatly summarizes the opposing viewpoints in his description 
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of “copyright optimism” versus “copyright pessimism.” Goldstein frames the debate as 
follows:   
On one side are lawyers who assert that copyright is rooted in natural justice, entitling 
authors to every last penny that other people will pay to obtain copies of their works. 
These are the copyright optimists: they view copyright’s cup of entitlement as always 
half-full, only waiting to be filled still further. On the other side of the debate are 
copyright pessimists, who see copyright's cup as half empty: they accept that 
copyright owners should get some measure of control over copies as an incentive to 
produce creative works, but they would like copyright to extend only so far as an 
encroachment on the general freedom of everyone to write and say what they 
please.97 
 
Copyright pessimists and copyright optimists disagree about where the status quo (Sq) 
is on the scope  Copyright pessimists accept that intellectual property protection is beneficial 
up to a point, but they argue that the current climate of broad exclusive rights has extended 
copyright too far.98 The copyright pessimist view is represented on Figure 1 by the point (Sqp, 
Wq), at which the curve is downward-sloping, with any increase in scope causing a reduction 
in net welfare.  In contrast, copyright optimists believe that greater protection of intellectual 
property will encourage even further investment.99 The copyright optimist view is 
represented on Figure 1 by the point (Sqo, Wq), at which the curve is upward-sloping with any 
increase in scope improving net welfare. Note that both Sqp and Sqo are associated with 
welfare level Wq, illustrating that it is possible to agree on the current benefits of the 
copyright system but still disagree on whether copyright scope is too broad, or too narrow.  
This simple model of the welfare effects of increasing copyright scope is consistent 
with the common law intuition that the demands of sequential innovation are such that there 
are diminishing returns to increasing the scope of copyright. In Campbell v. Acuff Rose, the 
                                                 
97 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF COPYRIGHT FROM 
GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX, 15 (1994). 
98 See e.g. Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 8. 
99 Goldstein himself falls into this camp; his recommendation is essentially to “extend rights into every 
corner where consumers derive value from literary and artistic works.” Goldstein, supra note 97, at 236.  
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Supreme Court identified an “… inherent tension in the need simultaneously to protect 
copyrighted material and to allow others to build upon it.”100  The Court, borrowing from 
Justice Story in Emerson v. Davies, also said that 
 “… in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which 
in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in literature, 
science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well 
known and used before.”101 
 
Stage 2: The effects of private ordering 
Even assuming that all authors do in fact borrow from pre-existing works, i.e. every 
first generation author is also a second generation author, the extent to which copyright 
scope must be limited to accommodate this fact may be overstated in the simple model.  
Menell and Scotchmer argue that the harm of too much protection may be “largely reversed 
if firms can license to avoid conflicting property rights, rather than being forced into the 
costly activity of avoiding them.”102 Although Menell and Scotchmer’s argument concentrates 
on private ordering through the licensing (the market), efficient private ordering can also be 
achieved through collectivization (the firm).  
The prospect of efficient private ordering fundamentally challenges the simple 
model’s assumption that increasing copyright scope is likely to increase the cost of 
expression more than the incentive effect at some point. As Ronald Coase made clear, the 
initial legal allocation of legal entitlements should not be confused with their ultimate 
allocation by the market.103 For example, a court may give party A the right to pollute, or it 
may give party B the right not to be polluted; either way the parties will trade their rights if 
the other party values the right more. Theoretically, if the market for intellectual property 
                                                 
100 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994). 
101 Id.  See also, Carey v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (K. B. 1803), per Lord Ellenborough. 
102 Menell and Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 24. 
103 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) 
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rights was perfectly efficient, any increase in the cost of expression caused by an expansion 
of copyright scope should be at least off-set by the increased expected rewards.104  
Subsequent authors seeking to build on an existing work may face higher costs, but those 
costs should be off-set by their increased prospective reward.105  In a Coasian world, without 
transaction costs or other market imperfections, there is no reason to assume that increasing 
copyright scope ever reduces welfare.   
Taken to an extreme, this view expands copyright optimism to general market 
optimism to derive the conclusion that increasing copyright scope is always welfare 
improving.106  Copyright optimism holds that increased control produces greater incentives 
and hence greater production, and hence greater welfare; market optimism holds that rights 
will be effectively redistributed through the market such that any subsequent producer who is 
capable of adding value to an original work will be able to negotiate a license from the 
copyright owner to do so. 107  The fact that first generation authors can extract rent from 
second generation authors is not typically considered relevant from a welfare perspective, as 
long as the subsequent user is still left with sufficient incentive to create.  This “market 
optimist” view of the welfare effects of copyright scope is depicted in Figure 2. The 
asymptotic shape of the curve in Figure 2 captures the market optimist’s assumption that any 
increase in copyright scope is welfare improving. Accordingly, in Figure 2, there is no S*, 
because there is no level of S at which a further increase in scope would not be welfare 
                                                 
104 In theory, increasing the ratio of the copyright owner’s private benefit to the social benefit of a 
work should perfect her incentives to produce. But that assumes that the process of internalization does not 
reduce the overall size of the pie, as it surely must if taken to extremes. As Mark Lemley points out, “[i]n no 
other area of the economy do we permit the full internalization of social benefits.” Lemley, Free Riding, supra 
note 8, at 1032.  
105 Menell and Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 23 – 24. 
106 Julie Cohen labels proponents of similar views as “Cyber-cons.” I prefer the less pejorative term 
“market optimist.” See, Cohen, supra note 8, at 464.  
107 Bell, supra note 94, at 584. 
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improving. Sq represents the status quo level of copyright scope and Wq its corresponding 
welfare effect. 







The accuracy of this market optimist view of the welfare effects of copyright scope 
depends on the efficiency of private ordering, both through the firm and the market. Adding 
fuel to the fire of optimism, Robert Merges points to the success of collective rights 
organizations such as ASCAP and certain patent pools, to argue that even if transactions 
costs are initially high, market solutions will often emerge to reduce them.108  Merges 
describes a process whereby repeat players in high transaction costs industries form collective 
rights organizations to administer their rights, effectively exchanging their property 
entitlements for liability rules.109  This suggests that even where copyright pessimists can 
                                                 
108 Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights 
Organizations 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996). 
109 Id.  
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identify apparent market failures in the short run, in the long run the market itself will 
address these problems. 
While ASCAP has an impressive history, it is important to keep in mind its 
limitations.  One of ASCAP’s main functions is providing off-the-shelf licenses for the public 
performance of musical works.  From the perspective of its customers, ASCAP lowers search 
and negotiation costs authors might otherwise encounter if they had to find and deal with 
each author separately.  From the perspective of it members, ASCAP also lowers negotiation 
costs; in addition it lowers the cost of monitoring and enforcing authors rights, which would 
be prohibitive on a case by case basis.  However, ASCAP primarily deals in the world of 
complete literal infringement, where rights are fairly certain.  There is no reason to believe 
that effective collective rights organizations would develop in scenarios of non-literal 
infringement in the absence of high volume, relatively uniform transactions between repeat 
players.110   
The case for strong market optimism in copyright is limited by the nature of the 
expansive nature of copyright itself.  It is almost axiomatic in conventional law and 
economics literature that the allocation of property rights increases certainty.111  For 
copyright, the opposite may be true.  As copyright scope expands, rights become increasingly 
vague – not increasingly well defined. So it becomes increasingly difficult to know whose 
rights you might be infringing with any given work.112 Harold Demsetz’s descriptive 
proposition that property rights evolve in response to increased value of the underlying 
                                                 
110 Merges acknowledges this limitation, noting that “[o]nly repeated transactions among right holders 
will give rise to the private institutions discussed in this Article. One-shot or sporadic interactions do not justify 
investments in exchange institutions.” Id., at 1319. 
111 Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, U CHI LEGAL F 207, 209 (1996). (When 
property rights are poorly specified, it is hard to transact about them, and correspondingly hard to promote the 
process of transaction that allocates resources to their highest valued uses.) 
112 The same argument can be made with respect to copyright duration: the passage of time makes 
tracing all the possible overlapping rights holders exponentially more complicated.  
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object has clear application to copyright.113  The increasing importance of information has 
been one of the primary rallying points of those who advocate extending the scope and 
duration of copyright. Nonetheless, Brett Frischmann questions the normative gloss of the 
Demsetzian thesis that property rights should extend in response to increased value.114  Where 
the benefits of increased propertization are concentrated, the application of basic public 
choice theory predicts that the level of propertization will exceed the Demsetzian equilibrium 
and property rights will be extended beyond the point where the social benefit of 
propertization outweighs the social cost.115  Frischmann questions the merits of ever-
expanding copyright for two fundamental reasons. First, not all externalities distort allocative 
decision making by the producers of first generation products.116 Second, the market will 
tend to undervalue information outputs that are used as infrastructure.117  I add a third 
observation that goes beyond externalities. Another reason to question the normative gloss 
of the Demsetzian thesis is that an expansion in copyright scope may render a superficially 
welfare improving outcome, but if the change increases the administrative costs of the 
copyright system, or the uncertainty costs borne by second generation authors, the change 
may in fact be welfare reducing.  
A potential cause of doctrinal inefficiency that deserves greater attention is the 
implications of strategic behavior. Market optimists who rely on the extensive reallocation of 
permissions through licensing must take into account the increased significance of strategic 
behavior encouraged by increased market participation. Obviously, if a change in copyright 
scope increases a second generation authors need to “go to the market” to attain copyright 
                                                 
113 See Frischmann, The Demsetzian Trend in Copyright, (working paper). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. (Externalities are ubiquitous in society, and in a wide variety of contexts, externalities are 
simultaneously valuable to society and yet irrelevant to investment decisions, or more generally, to resource 
allocation by the market.) See also David D. Haddock, Irrelevant Externality Angst,[cite]. 
117 Frischmann, Id. 
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permissions, she clearly faces increased transaction costs. But, in addition, she must also 
contend with the risk that first generation author’s will strategically use their hold-up power 
to extract the highest license fees possible. So, relying exclusively on market mechanisms of 
exchange creates the danger that strategic exploitation of the market system can reduce 
aggregate welfare. 
Another potential cause of doctrinal inefficiency that deserves greater attention is the 
possibility that private ordering may reduce the diversity of information production or result 
in overly-centralized decision making architectures.118 Increases in copyright scope may 
reduce diversity by increasing the concentration of information production, or by 
concentrating too much decision making power in the hands of first generation authors.119   
For example, a recent Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision has held that any digital music 
sampling, no matter how brief, nor how unrecognizable, requires a license from the 
copyright owner.120 Under this interpretation of the law,121 artists who use a lot of music 
samples are likely to gravitate towards large labels that offer them a significant catalog of 
primary material, where they can be sure of attaining the required permissions on reasonable 
terms.  Even if this does not reduce the production of music genres such as hip-hop, it may 
tend to centralize production under the roof of the large recording studios that already 
dominate the industry, and thus potentially reduce diversity, which is part of consumer 
welfare.122  
                                                 
118 See Wu, supra note 29. 
119 Id.  
120 Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir., 2005) As the court so eloquently 
stated, “Get a license or do not sample.” 
121 For a thoughtful critique of the Bridgeport decision, see Sang Lee, De Minimis Taking, Digital Sampling, 
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Stage 3: Reconciling the simple model with private ordering 
We are left with a mixed picture.  We should expect private ordering through 
licensing and the formation of firms to significantly reduce the negative welfare 
consequences of increasing copyright scope, but only up to a point. Figure 3 shows the 
welfare effects of copyright scope as initially depicted in Figure 1 (represented as a dashed 
line) but revised to take account of the mitigating effects of private ordering through both 
the firm and the market (represented by the solid line).  As illustrated, if we reject a strong 
version of market optimism, the negative effects of an increase in copyright scope can be 
mitigated by private ordering, but not entirely erased.  At the extreme level of copyright 
scope (S∞), the welfare effect of copyright falls to zero.  In this scenario any similarity 
constitutes copyright infringement, such that even the mere discussion of the Coase 
Theorem would require a license from its original author. Obviously, S∞ does not represent 
any level of copyright scope that is likely to occur, even if copyright was rewritten according 
to the desires of copyright interests such as the RIAA and the MPAA.  
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As Figure 3 illustrates, private ordering through both the market and the firm 
increases the level of copyright scope at which welfare is maximized (from S* to S**), but it 
does not change the fundamental relationship between copyright scope and welfare. The 
curve depicting the relationship is still convex; there is still a point, S**, at which any increase 
in copyright scope will reduce welfare below its maximum, W**.     
Stage 4: Recognizing indeterminacy 
None of this answers the question of whether the current level of copyright scope is 
more or less than S**. Empirical research on the efficiency of licensing and the consolidation 
of information production into firms has the potential to shed some light on this question, 
but it is unlikely to ever be conclusive.  Different views of the benefits or detriments of a 
further extension of copyright scope can be attributed either to different assessments of the 
relationship between copyright scope and welfare, or merely to different assessments of the 
status quo, or different views regarding the effectiveness of market reallocation. A copyright 
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pessimist is likely to view the relationship as positively skewed, such that most of the benefits 
of copyright protection come from fairly low levels of protection.  In contrast, a copyright 
optimist is likely to view the relationship as negatively skewed, such that it is not until 
copyright scope is very broad that the maximum benefits of copyright are seen. Figure 4 
illustrates three possible relationships between welfare and copyright scope, drawn from the 
perspectives ranging from less to more optimistic (pessimist (CP), neutral (CN) and optimist 
(CO)).   













Consider the move from S1 to S2, where S1 represents the current level of copyright 
scope and S2 represents a proposed increase.  The shift from S1 to S2 is welfare negative on 
the CP curve because welfare declines from W1 to W3.  On the CN curve, the shift from S1 to 
S2 is welfare neutral, although a move from S1 to any point between S1 and S2 would be 
welfare enhancing.  On the CO curve, the shift from S1 to S2 is welfare improving because 
welfare increases from W2 to W1.   
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The three curves in Figure 4 represent three different sets of assumptions about the 
relationship between copyright scope and welfare and varying degrees of optimism about the 
effect of an increase in copyright scope. However, they could equally represent the varying 
effects of copyright across three different industries.  Returning to the earlier example of the 
Bridgeport decision, a blanket prohibition on unlicensed digital sampling is likely to modestly 
increase the incentives for music production in general, but it would also significantly raise 
the costs of producing certain types of music, such as hip-hop.  Alternatively, it may be the 
case that folk musicians with a tradition of reinterpreting past works have lower fixed costs, 
require lower monetary rewards, but experience higher intrinsic rewards from production 
than pop singers in the mold of Britney Spears. Given those assumptions, folk singers would 
be best served by fairly low levels of copyright scope and are potentially adversely affected by 
even small increases in costs and uncertainty associated with higher levels of scope. 
This leads to another significant consideration: even if it is established that an 
increase in copyright scope would do more harm than good in one industry, we have no 
present basis on which to generalize that finding to other industries.123  In Figure 4 if we view 
CO, CN and CP, not as different views of the scope-welfare relationship in a given market, 
but rather as the scope-welfare relationship in three different markets, it is clear that 
increasing copyright scope might simultaneously increase welfare in relation to one sector of 
the economy, while reducing it in another. 
The application of general standards to specific situations is an inherent part of the 
process of common law adjudication.124 Those who advocate going one step further and 
                                                 
123 Dan Burk and Mark Lemley discuss a similar problem with respect to industry variation in patent 
law. Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1578 (2003) (Finding 
that economic evidence, patent doctrine, and legal theory, all vary by industry). 
124 A good example in copyright is the Judge Posner’s modification of the joint authorship test in 
Gaiman v MacFarlane to accommodate the creative processes of the comic book industry. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 
360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004).  
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tailoring specific doctrines to the perceived need for incentives in particular industries must 
take into account at least five potential hazards. First, industries are constantly evolving, thus 
industry definitions are inherently fluid and resist legal definition. Technological and social 
changes are continually reshaping the organization of industrial behavior and threatening to 
make today’s well drawn classification into tomorrow’s anachronism. For example, computer 
programming might once have been entirely differentiable from movie making, but the rise 
of animated films and big budget computer games has entirely blurred that distinction.  
Second, express reliance on industry status gives litigants significant incentives to 
push the boundaries of whatever industry definition is used. The gradual erosion of limits on 
patentable subject matter illustrates the difficulty of maintaining industry based distinctions 
once they come under sustained attack. Third, intra-industry variation may be just as 
significant as inter-industry variation depending on the level of generality of the industry 
definition used. Fourth, inter-industry effects are likely to be ambiguous. A change in the law 
tailored to one industry may have flow on consequences for other industries.  Fifth, industry 
tailoring may have negative effects on the overall political economy of copyright law.125  
Tailoring rules to particular industries concentrates their interests in lobbying for even more 
particularized benefits from Congress. None of this suggests that industry tailoring is never 
appropriate, just that its advocates need to carefully consider its feasibility in general and 
whether they have hit upon the most efficient doctrinal lever in particular.  
As discussed in detail in Part III, an industry tailoring approach to the fair use 
doctrine is particularly unworkable for all these reasons. In contrast, a situational approach to 
fair use is to be preferred because it makes more sense for courts to examine the nature of 
                                                 
125 See note __ infra and accompanying text.  
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the defendant’s activity, rather than her status or affiliation.  The key inquiry in this 
situational approach is whether the market should be presumed to be working, or not.126   
How then should we assess whether doctrines should be amended to account for 
perceived needs to alter scope, according to either industry-specific or more general 
demands?  The next two subsections develop the practical application of this theory.   
D. The importance of doctrinal efficiency 
Existing scholarship questioning the scope of tends to focus on either the public 
good nature of information or the positive externalities which result from information 
production,127 whereas this article highlights the relationship between copyright scope and 
doctrinal efficiency.    The existing literature is rife with assertions that copyright is either 
unnecessary or too broad in specific applications, and that various doctrinal levers should be 
employed to remedy those excesses. 128 However, even if we accept that copyright doctrines 
should be used as levers to more perfectly tailor copyright scope, we still need a mechanism 
to select which lever to pull and to understand when the costs of such tailoring are likely to 
exceed the benefits. 
In evaluating specific doctrinal recommendations, we need to assess both the effect 
on copyright scope in general and the specific costs and benefits of the doctrinal formulation 
in particular. From this perspective, it is simplistic to assume that all possible compositions 
of copyright scope have the same effect on the author’s expected reward, the author’s cost of 
expression and the administrative costs of the copyright system.129  As discussed in the 
previous subsection, the traditional economic analysis of copyright can be usefully reframed 
                                                 
126   
127 See e.g. Frischmann, Infrastructure, supra note 8.  
128 See, supra note 10. 
129 This simplifying assumption is perfectly reasonable in the context of Landes and Posner’s original 
work which focused on the economic efficiency of the copyright system as a whole. See Landes and Posner, 
supra note 1, at 325.  
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as an inquiry into the optimum level of copyright scope, as opposed to copyright protection 
(which includes both scope and duration). Although focusing on scope is in many ways an 
improvement on the traditional model, it remains compositionally indeterminate. Just as 
copyright protection is composed of both scope and duration; copyright scope itself 
represents the combined effects of numerous copyright doctrines, such as the idea-
expression distinction, the requirement for substantial similarity and the doctrine of fair 
use.130 Consequently, any assessment of the optimum level of scope will also be doctrinally 
indeterminate, as it too could be achieved through a theoretically infinite number of 
combinations of its various components.131   
The compositional indeterminacy of copyright scope means that economic analysis 
of copyright doctrines must consider both the optimal level of copyright scope and the 
efficiency of individual doctrines.  Even if one regards economic efficiency as the sole 
motivation for copyright doctrines,132 it is nonetheless apparent that copyright doctrines are 
only approximations for the efficiency concerns embedded within the law.  Furthermore, the 
flexibility of individual doctrines is limited by the need to establish tests that are capable of 
external observation and judicial application.  
There is no easy solution to interdependence of optimum copyright scope and 
optimum doctrinal composition, but it is clear that some comparison of doctrinal efficiency 
effects with the possible welfare gains of changing the level of copyright scope is necessary.  
One measure of the efficiency of individual doctrines is the disparity between the positive 
incentive effects of marginal increases in copyright scope and the associated increased costs 
                                                 
130 See supra note 35 regarding other possible determinants of scope.  
131 Landes and Posner hint at the problem of compositional indeterminacy, but they do not pursue its 
conclusions beyond noting that “[t]he more the cost of expression rises as [Z] increases… the lower will be the 
optimal degree of copyright protection.” Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 344. 
132 For a contrary point of view see, Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287 
(1988). See also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1535 (2005). 
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to potential second generation authors. Put simply, the efficiency of an individual copyright 
doctrine is determined by the extent that a change in scope it benefits first generation authors 
more than its costs second generation authors.   
Let α represent the difference between two levels of copyright scope. Assume that 
expanding a particular doctrine (from D1 and D2) will result in α increase in copyright scope. 
For example, a court could replace an objective audience based test of substantial similarity 
with a more inclusive test that merely required that the defendant’s work would remind a 
substantial section of the public of the work of the plaintiff.133 Even if preliminary economic 
analysis suggested expanding scope α degrees would result in a welfare improvement β, the 
desirability of the specific doctrinal change from D1 and D2 still depends on a comparison of 
the efficiency of the old doctrine compared to the new one.  
β measures the move along the existing scope-welfare curve, but this is not 
necessarily the only change which occurs when copyright scope is increased. Expanding a 
particular doctrine from D1 to D2 may also change the function of scope-welfare relationship, 
resulting in a separate welfare effect, γ. γ represents the welfare effect of the doctrinal shift, a 
function of the marginal efficiency of the doctrine in question.  If γ ≥ β, then the suggested 
doctrinal change is unwarranted. How do β and γ differ? β is the predicted welfare effect of a 
change in copyright scope, it assumes that the doctrinal shift used to bring about that change 
has no effect on the welfare-scope relationship.  In contrast, γ measures the welfare effect of 
changing the composition of copyright scope. Each combination of doctrines used to 
implement a change in scope may generate a different value for γ. 
                                                 
133 Compare the test for substantial similarity in Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein 
Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2003) with the rather vague standard articulated by the Ninth Circuit 
in right of publicity cases. See White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19253 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (Advertisement featuring robot in blond wig held appropriate Vanna White’ identity). 
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The intuition behind this proposition is that legal doctrines do not simply gravitate 
towards efficiency in the abstract, they tend to “stick” at formulations that prove to be stable, 
workable and administrable.134  As such, there may be significant uncertainty costs in 
attempting to precisely engineer doctrinal settings to manipulate the level of copyright scope. 
Furthermore, these costs are likely to vary depending on the doctrinal instrument chosen. 
Those who advocate the use of a particular doctrinal lever to control copyright scope must 
not only establish that an adjustment in scope is justified, but also that the lever they have 
chosen to pull is the right one. Returning to the previous example, rather than changing the 
requirement for substantial similarity, it might more efficient to adjust one of the other 
variables of copyright scope, such as the fair use doctrine.  
 It is important to understand the potential causes of doctrinal inefficiency and why 
the efficiency of doctrine is likely to vary. If a change in the law costs the average second 
generation author $100 more to create a work, that does not necessarily mean that the 
average first generation author receives $100 more copyright incentive. There is no reason to 
assume that the reward effect of any given change in the law will simply be the mirror image 
of the effect on the cost of expression.  
First, transaction costs create an obvious asymmetry between the first generation 
author’s reward and the second generation author’s cost of expression. Second, even in the 
absence of transaction costs, second generation authors face the choice to license or evade 
the rights of the first generation author, and that choice complicates the relationship between 
author’s expected rewards and their cost of expression for any given legal change.  If the 
second generation author licenses, the first generation author profits directly; but if the 
                                                 
134 At least until they are subject to some countervailing force for change.  
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second generation author evades through increased product differentiation, the first 
generation author only profits indirectly through a lessening of direct competition.135  
An economic analysis of copyright doctrine should not just consider the elusive 
question of the optimal level of copyright protection or even the optimal degree of copyright 
scope. It must also consider the how different doctrinal compositions of copyright might affect 
authors’ expected rewards, expected cost of expression and administrative costs for any given 
level of copyright scope.  To be sure, precisely measuring doctrinal efficiency is problematic, 
but the experience of judges administering the common law is likely to give them at least a 
broad intuitive grasp of the trade-offs involved.  
Indeed, improving the efficiency of copyright doctrines without reference to 
optimum copyright scope may be justified in some cases. If the resulting changes in scope are 
thought to be small, the welfare benefits of improving doctrinal efficiency will probably 
exceed the possible costs of moving scope in the wrong direction. For example, the 
application of the fair use doctrine could be greatly improved through a codification of 
certain safe-harbors already recognized in the common law.  Doctrinal rules are least efficient 
when they increase transaction costs and uncertainty, or where they impede market solutions.  
Mitigating this inefficiency is a feasible use of law and economics, probably more feasible 
than finding the optimal level of copyright protection or even the optimal level of copyright 
scope. 
                                                 
135 Alternatively, the second generation author’s evasion could be conceived in terms of an increased 
entry cost to an undifferentiated market, as opposed to increased product differentiation. Either way the first 
author profits indirectly through a reduction of competition. See supra note 37. 
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E. Applying the copyright scope framework  
The forgoing discussion can be reduced to four conclusions, three of which in turn 
provide useful metrics to assess a variety of specific doctrinal recommendations in copyright 
law.  
First, it can be said with a high degree of confidence that a level of copyright scope 
that approaches either zero or infinity will be sub-optimal.136 By itself this does not serve as a 
useful benchmark, but it is an important foundational point.  The normative implications of 
this conclusion depend on one’s own assessment of where the current scope of copyright lies 
along that spectrum. The current scope of copyright is clearly less than S∞, but whether it is 
more or less than S* remains an open question. Copyright scope today is undoubtedly high 
compared to any other period of history.137On the other hand, although copyright scope has 
undoubtedly increased over time, less robust application of the idea expression distinction, 
lower thresholds of substantial similarity, and more restrictive interpretations of fair use 
doctrine are easy to imagine.138   
Also, the normative implications of the uncertainty of the status quo in relation to the 
optimum level of copyright scope are murky. Copyright scope is often affected by external 
events. For example, the increasing use of personal computers has increased copyright scope 
because the use of a copyrighted digital work also necessitates copying that work into a 
computer’s random access memory.139 However, computer technology has also reduced the 
                                                 
136 Clearly, this is by no means the first article on copyright to reach this conclusion, nor is it likely to 
be the last. See e.g. Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, supra note 8, at 638); Cohen, supra note 8, at 514.  
137 Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 8, at 7 – 8, 141 – 44. 
138 For example, current tests as to substantial similarity are arguably more stringent than in the past. 
See Nimmer’s discussion of Tufenkian Import/Export and the rehabilitation of the Second Circuit’s “total concept 
and feel” test for substantial similarity. 4-13 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03; Tufenkian Import/Export 
Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2003).  
139 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993).  
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effective scope of copyright by drastically decreasing the cost of copying.140 Certainly, there is 
good case for advising caution in relation to any further deliberate expansion in copyright 
scope, but that leaves open the question of whether copyright should be reengineered in 
response to external changes that appear to have caused a significant shift in copyright scope 
to maintain the current level of copyright scope.  We should be skeptical of our power to 
perfectly engineer copyright scope.  
The second conclusion is that the net welfare effects of a change in copyright scope 
are dependant on the efficiency of private ordering.  The more efficiently the market 
reallocates rights through licensing or the consolidation of production into firms, the higher 
the optimum level of copyright scope will be.   If the scope-welfare function is convex, not 
only is the efficiency of private ordering likely to vary generally, but the degree of efficiency 
required to justify an increase in copyright scope on welfare grounds increases with the level 
of copyright scope. Thus the higher the existing level of copyright scope is, the more 
perfectly efficient private ordering must be to sustain yet further increases.  
The third conclusion is that the compositional indeterminacy of copyright scope (and 
copyright protection more generally) means that economic analysis of copyright doctrines 
must consider both the optimal level of copyright scope and the effect of different doctrinal 
compositions of copyright scope.  Doctrinal recommendations that focus on optimizing the 
scope of copyright in the abstract but do not account for the effect of a proposed doctrinal 
change on transaction costs or uncertainty are necessarily incomplete.  
The fourth conclusion that can be drawn from the forgoing models of the welfare 
effects of copyright scope is that determining the net welfare effects of any given change in 
copyright doctrine is extremely difficult. Even if a cost-benefit analysis of the welfare effects 
                                                 
140 Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, supra note 1, at 84.   
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of a change in copyright scope with respect to one particular group was clear, the net welfare 
effect across all affected groups remains uncertain. It would be difficult to say prospectively 
whether a change in the law that made Hollywood blockbusters less profitable but expanded 
the freedom of independent film makers was a net positive, especially because each provides 
the infrastructure for the other in some fashion. Empirical evidence of the effect of changes 
in copyright scope has the potential to further clarify the nature of the welfare-scope 
relationship, but subject to both inter- and intra-industry variation. 
The welfare-scope relationship is both complicated and subject to substantial 
variation, both within and between industries.  Doctrinal recommendations which simply 
assume that the welfare effects of a change in copyright scope are easily ascertainable are far 
too simplistic. Even where data is available, it will be open to competing explanations and 
extrapolations. Furthermore, advocates of industry focused tailoring solutions must consider 
whether intra-industry variation might not be just as significant as the inter-industry variation 
they seek to design policy around. 
In summary, the insights offered by the analysis of copyright scope in this article go 
well beyond the mere assertion that infinite copyright is undesirable (although that is an 
important starting point). In particular, the forgoing analysis has established the following: 
(1)  The efficiency of private ordering is the key determinant of the ideal level of 
copyright scope.   
(2)  The welfare-scope relationship is both complicated and subject to substantial 
variation, both within and between industries.  
(3)  Doctrinal recommendations that focus on optimizing the scope of copyright 
in the abstract but do not account for the effect of a doctrinal change on 
transaction costs or uncertainty are necessarily incomplete.   
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The next part applies these conclusions as metrics for assessing the primary law and 
economics approaches to copyright’s fair use doctrine.  
 
PART III – APPLICATION TO FAIR USE 
This part builds on the previous sections of the article by assessing the predominant 
law and economics approaches to copyright’s fair use doctrine in light of the conclusions 
above.  The conclusions from the previous part can be restated as metrics or benchmarks for 
analysis as follows:141 
(1)  Does the recommended application take account of the role of private 
ordering in determining the ideal scope of copyright? 
(2)  Is the recommended application doctrinally efficiency? 
(3)  Is the recommended application feasible in light of the expectation that there 
will be substantial variation, both within and between industries, in the 
welfare-scope relationship? 
By applying these metrics for assessing doctrinal proposals, this article illustrates how 
the gap between the traditional law and economics of copyright and specific doctrinal 
analysis can be bridged.  The development and application of these metrics does not 
definitively determine which doctrinal proposals are either efficient or normatively desirable, 
but it makes a contribution by filtering out some ill-conceived recommendations, and by 
identifying areas for improvement in others.  The analysis that follows is devoted to the 
traditionally “troublesome” doctrine of fair use,142 but the metrics developed in this article 
can be applied to wide range of doctrinal recommendations in copyright.  
                                                 
141 The metrics have been reordered to suit the application that follows. 
142 See, Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2nd Cir. 1939). 
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The two primary law and economics contributions to the fair use doctrine, the 
market failure test and the application of a cost-benefit analysis present a puzzling 
contradiction. Resting on an initial presumption of efficient private ordering, the market 
failure approach places a heavy burden on defendants to establish fair use. 143144  In contrast, 
the cost-benefit approach manifests a deep pessimism in the capacity of market institutions 
to provide the kind of flexibility that the users of copyrighted works require, and tilts the 
scales heavily in favor of fair use.145  These approaches share a common foundation in law 
and economics, and yet they reach very different conclusions as to how judges should apply 
the fair use doctrine.   
The following subsections outline each theory, then assess each of the theories 
against the metrics listed above.  
A. Law and economics theories of fair use 
1. Fair Use as Market Failure 
Since it was first articulated by Wendy Gordon over twenty years ago,146 the concept 
of fair use as market failure has been controversial,147 and arguably misunderstood.148 
                                                 
143 Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and 
Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1653-54 (1982) (hereafter, Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure).  
144 Id. at 1614. (Gordon proposed a three part test as follows: “Fair use should be awarded to the 
defendant in a copyright infringement action when (1) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to 
defendant is socially desirable; and (3) an award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives 
of the plaintiff copyright owner.”) 
145 Variations of a cost-benefit analysis of fair use have been proposed by a number of scholars, most 
comprehensively by William Fisher and Glynn Lunney. See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing The Fair Use 
Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661 (1988); Glynn S. Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. 
REV. 975 (2002). See notes __ – __ infra and accompanying text.  
146 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 143, at 1653-54. 
147 See for example: Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market 
Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 539 (2003); Lunney, Sony Revisited, supra note 145; Robert P. Merges, The 
End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the “Newtonian” World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
115, 130-34 (1997); and Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining The Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright 
Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997). 
148 According to Gordon herself. See Gordon, Market Failure and Intellectual Property: A Response To 
Professor Lunney. 82 B.U. L. REV. 1031 (hereafter, Gordon, Market Failure and Intellectual Property). See also 
Merges, The End of Friction, supra note 147, at 130. 
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Nonetheless its influence is undeniable.149 The essential logic of the fair use as market failure 
paradigm is that strong property rights facilitate an efficient market in the exploitation of 
creative works, but that on occasions where that market fails, exceptions to strong property 
rights in the form of fair use have to be made.150 
Applications of Gordon’s market failure framework have largely concentrated on the 
role of transaction costs151 in justifying fair use.152 However, it is important to note at the 
outset that Gordon’s initial formulation also addressed other potential causes of market 
failure, including externalities and “non-economic motivations.”153  Gordon’s original test for 
applying fair use required the defendant to establish three things: (1) the presence of market 
failure; (2) the social desirability of allowing the defendant’s unauthorized use to continue; 
and (3) that finding fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the 
copyright owner.154 
There have been many attempts to apply fair use as market failure to extrapolate an 
efficient application of the fair use doctrine in particular situations. For example, Landes and 
Posner reframe the fair use status of parody in terms of a failure in the market for permission 
to criticize in the form of a derivative work.155 A failure of the market for permission to 
                                                 
149 Gordon’s Fair Use as Market Failure has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Sony 
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984) (Justice Blackmun, in dissent); 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (O’Connor, J., per curium); and 
by the Second Circuit in Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 1998); by the 
Seventh Circuit in Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002); by the Ninth Circuit in Fisher v. 
Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) and Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 
F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000); In addition, Gordon’s Fair Use as Market Failure was clearly influential in the 
Second Circuit’s decision in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
150 See, Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me? Notes on Market Failure and the Parody Defense in 
Copyright, 21 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 305, 307 (1993) (noting that deviations from a presumption 
against fair use “must be pleaded with special facts, and convincingly.”) 
151 The term ‘transaction cost’ broadly refers to any cost incurred in relation to an economic exchange. 
See Tirole, supra note 38, at 29.  
152 See note __ infra. 
153 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 143. 
154 Id., at 6014. Note that Gordon no longer holds to the third element of her proposed test. See 
Gordon, Intellectual Property and Market Failure, supra note 148, at 1034-1035. 
155 Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 359 – 360. 
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parody appears inevitable, since it would be unrealistic to expect authors to voluntarily allow 
themselves to be criticized.156 Although this is a convincing explanation, it fails to identify 
exactly why the author’s subjective value in not being ridiculed should not be fully 
represented.157 As Alfred Yen argues, the idea that parody represents a market failure rests on 
a value judgment that the author’s anti-dissemination motives should be given less respect 
than other preferences.158  As a matter of copyright doctrine, this is fairly easy to explain. 
Copyright does not exist for the benefit of individual authors, but rather for the promotion 
of the progress of science and the useful arts.159  Given that rationale, a preference for 
dissemination seems obvious. But, from an abstract utility maximizing perspective, it is hard 
to see why we shouldn’t be completely neutral about an author’s desire to suppress 
information. In which case, anti-dissemination motives are not a source of market failure.160 
Landes and Posner also regard quotation and reference in the service of review and 
criticism more generally as justified under a market failure approach.161  The authors argue 
that if reviews depended on consent, they would lose credibility with the public and therefore 
be less valuable to both authors and the public.162 Consequently, the benefits of a no-consent 
rule to authors as a class outweigh the individual interests of those authors who get bad 
reviews. From a game theory perspective, this can be framed as a simple coordination 
problem. However, applying the logic of Merges’ Contracting Into Liability Rules to the problem 
                                                 
156 As the Supreme Court notes in Campbell, “People ask for criticism, but they only want praise.” 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 592 (U.S. 1994) (quoting from S. Maugham, Of Human Bondage 
241 (Penguin ed. 1992)) 
157 See, Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won't Sell: Parody, Fair Use and Efficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 79 (1991). 
158 Id.  
159 U.S. Const. Art 8. 
160 Yen, supra note 157, at 79. 
161 Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 358. 
162 Id., at 359. 
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of reviews,163 one might ask why we should not simply rely on the emergence of market 
mechanisms to overcome such problems. If authors as a class really benefit from reviews, 
they should find some contractual mechanism to enable them to pre-commit to allowing 
reviews.164 
Furthermore, in response to the recent extension of duration,165 a number of authors 
have suggested that courts should adjust the scope of copyright protection to account for the 
passage of time by expressly considering time as a factor in fair use analysis.166 Joseph Liu 
argues that as a work becomes older, the ability of the author to prevent re-use, critique, 
transform, and adaptation of that work should diminish, i.e. “fair use should be greater for 
Mickey Mouse than for Harry Potter.”167 Richard Posner and William Patry present a 
proposal that is similar, but more clearly framed within the market failure paradigm. They 
suggest that the problem of obtaining licenses to reproduce old works of limited commercial 
value also merits fair use.168  
2. A Cost-Benefit Approach to Fair Use 
In the course of his epic reconstruction of the fair use doctrine, William Fisher 
proposes an altogether different law and economics based approach to resolving fair use 
cases. Fisher suggests that fair use cases should be determined through a detailed 
examination of the costs and benefits of the incentives and impositions resulting from 
                                                 
163 See note 108 supra and accompanying text.  
164 Reasons why this may not be the case are addressed below, see notes __ – __ and accompanying 
text.  
165 See, Copyright Term Extension Act (1998). 
166 Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409 (2002) 
167 Id. at 410. See also, Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775 (2003) (Fewer 
unauthorized uses should be fair uses in the first years or decades of a copyright term, and more and more 
unauthorized uses should be deemed fair as a work grows older). 
168 Richard Posner and William Patry, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1639 (2004). 
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competing uses of any given work.169 The “cost” of allowing fair use is the notional reduction 
in the copyright owner’s incentives compared to what they might have been, had fair use not 
been allowed. The copyright owner’s potential incentives in this calculation include any 
licensing revenue she could have extracted from the defendant or any similarly situated 
persons.170 The “benefit” of allowing fair use is that the defendant is neither denied the use 
of the work, nor is she forced to pay the copyright owner for that use.  Again, this includes 
not just the actual defendant, but also all similarly situated potential defendants.171 
The idea of resolving fair use decisions through a cost-benefit analysis is simple to 
state, but difficult to apply. Under Fisher’s approach, a judge would have to catalog every 
conceivable type of use of a work, ranging from reprints to action figures and beyond, then 
to determine the value of each potential use, rank them, and weigh them against the range of 
costs to the current and other future possible defendants.172  
Glynn Lunney offers another version of a cost benefit analysis for fair use.173 Lunney 
urges courts to regard the four statutory factors as historically dated “proxies for the balance 
of competing public interests” and adopt a more general cost-benefit approach to the fair 
use.174 Similar to Fisher, Lunney argues that, “[i]n an ideal world with perfect information, 
courts could resolve the fair use issue by determining precisely the social value of additional 
authorship resulting from prohibiting a use and then comparing that value to the social value 
                                                 
169 Fisher, supra note 145.  A cost-benefit analysis is also the second limb of Gordon’s test, once the 
initial screen of market failure has been satisfied. Although Gordon’s formulation is slightly different, in that she 
would determine whether allowing fair use was socially beneficial by asking whether “when the “market failure” 
were cured, the price that the owner would demand is lower than the price that the user would offer.” Gordon, 
Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 143, at 1614.  
170 Fisher, supra note 145, at 1699. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Lunney, Sony Revisited, supra note 145, at 1023. 
174 Id., at 998. 
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of allowing the use to continue.”175  What is striking about this formulation is that it suggests 
that the ideal resolution of fair use cases rests literally on a case-by-case analysis.  Whether 
this is what Lunney actually intended, or merely a paradigmatic extrapolation, is unclear. 
Accordingly, the application of the metrics that follows considers a cost-benefit analysis 
applied on a purely case by case level, a highly specified level that required a new cost-benefit 
analysis for all but the narrowest of factual classes, and a cost-benefit analysis applied at a 
much broader industry level.  
B. Applying the doctrinal metrics to fair use as market failure 
1. The efficiency of private ordering 
The first test of any law and economics based doctrinal recommendation should be 
whether it takes account of the relationship between the ideal level of copyright scope and 
the efficiency of private ordering. Prima facie, the market failure approach to fair use would 
seem to pass this test with flying colors, but a more detailed analysis suggests some grounds 
for qualification. Although the market failure test for fair use is appropriately focused on the 
central question of whether the market is working or not, the mechanics of the test are 
loaded significantly in favor of false positives, i.e., of concluding that the market is working 
when in fact it is not.176 In particular, the requirement that the defendant prove the existence 
of market failure as a prerequisite for a finding of fair use177 tilts this apparently neutral 
framework decidedly in favor of the copyright owner.  
The allocation of the burden of proof in fair use cases is extremely important because 
of the difficulty of actually proving that a market is or is not working.  The Supreme Court’s 
Sony decision illustrates an evidentiary stalemate typical of fair cases: the movie studios were 
                                                 
175 Id. 
176 See Wu, supra note 29 on the distinction between Type I and Type II errors and their comparative 
desirability.  
177 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 143, at 1614. 
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unable to establish that time-shifting actually resulted in an adverse market effect, but nor 
could Sony establish that such an effect would not occur in the future. Ultimately, the case 
turned on the majority’s presumption that non-commercial uses were fair uses.  178  
Transaction costs, externalities and “non-market motivations” are always present to some 
degree in real world markets. Consequently, merely identifying the existence of one or more 
potential causes of market failure will never be sufficient; the defendant (or the plaintiff) 
must establish that these market imperfections are of a sufficient degree to constitute a 
market failure.  
The presence of transaction costs that exceed the potential gains from trade between 
a copyright owner and a subsequent user is probably the most common rationalization for 
findings of fair use.179  The term ‘transaction cost’ broadly refers to any cost incurred in 
relation to an economic exchange.180  At a minimum, participants in the market for copyright 
permissions must (1) determine what permissions they require (2) locate all potential rights 
holders, and (3) negotiate with those rights holders over prices and terms. Additionally, there 
may also be costs to maintaining and enforcing agreements.181 Transaction costs are 
significant because they may prevent otherwise efficient reallocation from taking place.182 For 
example, even though library users might be willing to pay a small price for permission to 
photocopy from text books and journal articles, they are probably unwilling to also bear the 
costs of contacting the relevant copyright owners and negotiating a license. If transaction 
                                                 
178 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984) (“If the Betamax 
were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. 
The contrary presumption is appropriate here, however, because the District Court's findings plainly establish 
that time-shifting for private home use must be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity.”) 
179 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 143. 
180 See, supra note 151.  
181 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 143. 
182 Id. (When the transaction costs outweigh the net benefits that the parties would otherwise 
anticipate from a transfer, then the presence of the transaction costs may block an otherwise desirable shift in 
resource use.) 
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costs exceed the potential gains from trade, the market will fail to allocate resources 
efficiently.183 
Although identifying potential sources of transaction costs is relatively easy, proving 
that they are, and will remain, so significant that the market has failed, is considerably more 
difficult. Indeed, a number of authors stress that exceptions to copyright based on 
transaction costs should be granted only sparingly.184 As Rob Merges explains, one reason is 
that the presence of transaction costs creates an incentive for innovative market solutions 
that reduce transaction costs in the long term, without the disadvantages of judicial or 
government regulation.185 Merges’ analysis suggests that even the identification of apparent 
market failures in the short run does not merit limiting the scope of the copyright owner’s 
rights because, in the long run, the market itself will address these problems.186  A second 
reason often given as to why courts should not intervene in the face of transaction costs is 
that advances in technology may enable more efficient private ordering, by reducing 
transactional barriers and enabling copyright owners to control their works more effectively 
through the use of sophisticated permissions systems and digital rights management.187 Some 
scholars have even predicted that these technological developments may obviate the need for 
the fair use doctrine entirely.188  For both these reasons, transaction cost stories are easy to 
                                                 
183 Note that with respect to copyright, the potential gains from trade are normally equal to the user’s 
valuation of the right to make a copy, because the good in question is nonrivalrous.  Consequently, where 
transaction costs are greater than a user’s valuation, the market will fail to allocate resources efficiently.  In such 
cases, the would-be second user can either heed the exclusive rights of the copyright owner and forego the 
activity, or she can ignore those rights and reap the benefit of that use.  Where transaction costs make licensing 
impossible, the copyright owner is neither benefited nor disadvantaged by unauthorized uses of a work; no 
matter what choice the would-be second user makes, the copyright owner gets nothing and loses nothing. 
184 Merges, supra note 108. See also, Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 358. 
185 Merges, Id. 
186 See, Id. 
187 See, Goldstein, supra note 82, at 223-24. See Cohen, supra note 8, for an extensive discussion of this 
school of thought and its limitations. 
188 See, e.g. Bell, supra note 94. 
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tell but hard to prove, thus elevating the significance of the market failure test’s allocation of 
the burden of proof. 
The allocation of the burden of proof onto the defendant is likely to be even more 
loaded against finding fair use where the defendant’s case relies not on transaction costs, but 
on less tangible causes of market failure such as externalities or non-economic motivations. 
There is a significant literature criticizing narrow applications of the market failure approach 
for their failure to account for externalities, which does not need to be repeated here.189  The 
problem for a defendant seeking to prove market failure (or for a plaintiff seeking to 
disprove it) is that the market failure approach itself gives little guidance as to what degree of 
positive externalities or non-economic motivations might justify the application of fair use.  
For example, it might be true that billionaire industrialist Howard Hughes bought up all the 
copyrights in magazine stories chronicling his life in an attempt to suppress that 
information.190  But without a mechanism to value Hughes’ interests differently to his own 
subjective valuation (as measured by his willingness to pay, and presumed unwillingness to 
license), simply describing the copyright owner’s motives as “non-economic” is not 
analytically useful by itself.191  
Labeling someone as “irrational” does not amount to a systemic analysis of the 
efficiency of private ordering. From the perspective of law and economics, a better approach 
to assessing the efficiency of private ordering in such cases would be to rely on the insights 
of the literature on game theory or behavioral economics to identify scenarios where the 
market is likely to fail.192  Perhaps the most prominent application of game theory analysis in 
                                                 
189 Loren, supra note 147, Lemley, Economics, supra note 8 Cohen, supra note 8; Frischmann, 
Infrastructure, supra note 8. 
190 Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311-312 (2d Cir., 1966). 
191 This is similar to Yen’s point about parody. See Yen supra note 157. 
192 __ 
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the intellectual property literature is Michael Heller’s “anticommons theory.”193 Heller and 
Rebecca Eisenberg have suggested that unlike the familiar “tragedy of the commons” which 
leads to over-use of a scarce resource,194 in some circumstances fragmented ownership of 
upstream rights can lead to an anticommons, the under-use of a valuable resource.195  In the 
biotechnology context, Heller and Eisenberg argue that the availability of patents on gene 
fragments threatens to create an anticommons, thus stifling the process of drug discovery.196  
As the authors explain, the increasing patentability of gene fragments known as ESTs 
(expressed sequence tags),197 means that any one downstream company seeking to develop a 
commercial end-product must negotiate with a multitude of upstream rights holders, any one 
of whom has the power to hold up the product.198   
As Ben Depoorter and Francesco Parisi suggest, courts should take into account: (i) 
the number of copyright holders; (ii) the degree of complementarity between the copyrighted 
inputs; and (iii) the degree of independence between the various copyright holders.199  
Additional factors courts should also take into account include: (iv) the second generation 
author’s degree of uncertainty as to the value of any one input or the value of the final 
product; (v) the extent to which potential hold-up problems would unduly deter second 
                                                 
193 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 621, 675 (1998). This is not actually an intellectual property piece but much of its subsequent 
application has been in intellectual property, see, e.g. Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents 
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998) (Anticommons theory applied to 
patents on gene fragments and other biological materials). 
194 See, Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
195 Heller, supra note 193, at 624. 
196 Heller and Eisenberg, supra note 193. (A proliferation of intellectual property rights upstream may 
be stifling life-saving innovations further downstream in the course of research and product development) 
197 An Expressed Sequence Tag is a tiny portion of an entire gene that can be used to help identify 
unknown genes and to map their positions within a genome. See, National Center for Biotechnology 
Information, A Basic Introduction to the Science Underlying NCBI Resources, available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/est.html. 
198 This is especially problematic in the context of royalty stacking and reach-through license 
provisions. See Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 
442 (noting that NIH guidelines strongly discourage the use of Reach-Through Royalties) 
199 Ben Depoorter and Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory Explanation, 21 
INT'L REV. L & ECON. 453 (2002). (Concluding that “viewed in light of the anticommons theory, fair use 
doctrines retain a valid efficiency justification even in a zero transaction cost environment.”)  
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generation authors; and (vi) whether transactions are too heterogeneous to allow market 
based solutions to develop. 
These factors can in turn be incorporated into the common law doctrine of fair use 
and provide a more discriminating basis for determining the allocation of the burden of 
establishing whether the market is working or not. Returning to the application of fair use to 
criticism, quotation and review, it seems unlikely that market driven opt-in mechanisms 
would develop given that authors, sensitivity to criticism, expectation of criticism and 
countervailing desire for publicity are all heterogeneous.200  
In addition to considerations arising from game theory and behavioral economics, 
some of the recent literature on industrial organization and intellectual property may also 
identify situations in which the consequences of market failure will be most severe, and 
therefore where an over-inclusive fair use standard is preferable to an under-inclusive 
formulation.201  
In summary, the market failure approach to fair use does take account of the role of 
private ordering in determining the optimum scope of the copyright owner’s rights. 
However, a more nuanced approach to determining whether it is the defendant or the 
plaintiff carries the burden in relation to market failure would improve the approach. 
2. Doctrinal efficiency 
To the extent it effectively forecloses opportunities for the application of the fair use 
doctrine, the market failure test is appealing in terms of administrative efficiency.  However, 
adopting the market failure test in its current form would constitute a significant expansion 
of copyright scope.  Invariably requiring the defendant to establish market failure implicitly 
                                                 
200 Another is that reviews uncompromised by the author’s consent generate more significant positive 
externalities than reviews with permission. 
201 See, Wu, supra note 29. 
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assumes that the copyright owner’s rights are absolute and that any deviation from those 
rights requires substantial justification. This formulation does not sit well with the either the 
text of the Copyright Act, or the case law applying the fair use doctrine.  All of the copyright 
owner’s exclusive rights under the Copyright Act are expressly qualified as “subject to” fair 
use.202 Although the courts have been less than clear as to the exact procedural status of fair 
use,203 the fact that, procedurally, fair use must be asserted as an affirmative defense,204 does 
not mean that it is always the defendant who carries the burden of proof once the defense 
has been properly raised.205  
In short, the market failure approach to fair use would be doctrinally efficient, but if 
applied in its current form it would also significantly expand the scope of copyright. As 
suggested above, the market failure approach would be improved if it was modified to 
include a more discriminating allocation of the burden of proof. Admittedly, modifying this 
rather arbitrary feature of the test would reduce the efficiency of the doctrine to some degree, 
but trade would seem to be worthwhile.  
3. Variation in the scope-welfare relationship 
The third metric asks whether the recommended application is feasible in light of the 
expectation that there will be substantial variation, both within and between industries, in the 
welfare-scope relationship. Gordon’s market failure test addresses this by calling for a cost-
                                                 
202 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2005). Note also that the existence of the fair use doctrine has advantaged 
copyright owners as a class by enabling their rights to be broadly defined in the first place. See, Sag, supra note 
63. 
203 Compare, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (U.S. 1984); 
with Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). 
204 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001). See also, Bateman 
v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 (11th Cir. 1996). 
205 The Supreme Court’s Sony decision implies that the burden of establishing fair use shifts according 
whether the defendant’s use was “commercial” or “non-commercial.” Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (U.S. 1984) (“If the Betamax were used  to make copies for a commercial or 
profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. The contrary presumption is appropriate 
here…”). See also, Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(“Game Genie users are engaged in a non-profit activity. Their use of the Game Genie to create derivative 
works therefore is presumptively fair.”) 
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benefit analysis in the event that the defendant is able to establish market failure. This 
necessarily incorporates a case-by-case cost-benefit analysis, and thus takes on all of the 
problems of that approach, as discussed in Part III. C. below.   
There is however, no reason that a market failure approach must incorporate a cost-
benefit analysis. The market failure approach accounts for variation in the efficiency of 
private ordering, which in turn is a significant determinant of variation in scope-welfare 
relationship generally. Once a court has determined that the relevant market should be 
presumed to have failed, or has been shown to have failed, a cost-benefit analysis seems 
unnecessary.  
Consequently, viewed in its best light, the market failure approach to fair use 
addresses the variation in the scope-welfare relationship by focusing on a substantial cause of 
that variation – the efficiency of private ordering.  
4. Overall assessment of fair use as market failure 
The clear strength of the market failure approach to fair use is that it recognizes the 
centrality of the efficiency of private ordering and is responsive to variation in the efficiency 
of private ordering. The primary weakness of the market failure approach is its uniform 
allocation of the burden of proof with respect to the existence of market failure. This feature 
both predisposes the test to false positives, and is inconsistent with the judicial application of 
the fair use doctrine.  
In the final analysis, the market failure approach to fair use performs well when 
assessed against the metrics developed in this article, but the metrics also highlight ways in 
which the market failure test could be improved. Principally, the market failure approach to 
fair use should adopt a more discerning basis for allocating the burden of proof. One method 
of doing this is to apply some of the observations form game theory, behavioral economics 
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and industrial organization to identify scenarios where the market is likely to fail, or scenarios 
in which the potential consequences of market failure justify a presumption that errs in favor 
of finding fair use.  
C. Applying the metrics to cost-benefit approach 
1. The efficiency of private ordering 
In contrast to the explicit focus of the market failure test, the cost benefit approach 
to fair use only considers the efficiency of private ordering by implication. The cost benefit 
approach presumes that courts can vary the application of copyright according to the 
author’s need for copyright incentives. Given the high degree of judicial dexterity already 
assumed by the cost benefit approach, it seems reasonable to assume judges could also take 
into consideration the likelihood that rights will be effectively redistributed by the market.  
In the ideal case, a judge with perfect information could exactly tailor the application 
of the fair use doctrine to maximize net social welfare, i.e. to find the optimal level of 
copyright scope.  In reality, this is quite infeasible, but even if it was possible, the costs of 
such an exercise would overwhelm the benefits. In the alternative, the ability of a judge to 
make the same kind of determination in a more generalized, industry-wide cost-benefit 
analysis is also questionable. This is because a test-case decision on the fairness of a particular 
use may be needed before copyright owners can be expected to establish workable market 
mechanisms. For example, one could argue that the Supreme Court’s Sony decision was ill-
advised because, if the Court had found time-shifting was not fair use, content producers and 
technology manufacturers would have inevitably negotiated some kind of compensation 
system to allow the technology to develop.206 So, while the fact that a particular set of facts 
                                                 
206 Or a statutory royalty may have been imposed by either the courts or the legislature. See, Sony 
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 499 (1984) 
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has resulted in litigation may itself indicate a specific failure of private ordering, that failure 
itself may have been the product of legal uncertainty rather than defective market structure.  
In summary, the cost benefit approach to fair use fails to offer a plausible method to 
evaluate and or respond to the variation in the efficiency of private ordering.  
2. Doctrinal efficiency 
The second metric by which law and economics doctrinal recommendations should 
be assessed relates to doctrinal efficiency. As discussed in Part II, even if preliminary 
economic analysis suggested expanding the scope of copyright would result in a net welfare 
improvement, the posited welfare benefits must be off set against any welfare losses 
associated with the particular doctrinal change used to implement that change in scope. 
Failure to account for the high costs and speculative benefits of asking judges to fine tune the 
scope of copyright is the main defect of the paradigmatic cost benefit approach to fair use.   
Although both Fisher and Lunney are somewhat vague about the level of detail to 
which a cost-benefit analysis should descend, both suggest that courts should analyze the 
balance of competing interests of the copyright owner and the public; and that resulting 
balance should then be applied to determine whether a particular use is fair or foul, based on 
its net contribution to social welfare.207  Fisher and Lunney each acknowledge the practical 
difficulties inherent in resolving fair use cases through a judicial cost-benefit analysis, yet 
both also advocate that approach nonetheless.208   
                                                 
207 Lunney, Sony Revisited, supra note 145, at 999, Fisher, supra note 145, at 1699.  
208 Lunney argues that “[a]lthough striking such an ideal balance in every case remains beyond the 
reach of our current legal and economic understanding, we can come considerably closer to the ideal balance by 
examining the competing public interests directly, rather than by continuing to rely on the four nineteenth 
century factors.” Lunney, Id., at 999. Similarly, Fisher asks rhetorically “[i]f such a comparative analysis must be 
employed in most cases, is not economic analysis in this doctrinal context hopelessly impracticable? … Even so, 
the analysis may have considerable value. The assumptions used … were not wildly unrealistic. Some of the 
conclusions reached by the hypothetical judge may survive transition to the real world. Moreover, a simplified 
version of the procedure might enable a court at least to increase allocative efficiency, if not to maximize it.” 
Fisher, Id. at 1718-19. 
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Lunney is particularly detailed about what he thinks courts should do. He argues that 
in order to prevail against an assertion of fair use, copyright owners should demonstrate both 
that the use in question presents a “meaningful likelihood of actual or future harm” to the 
value of the work,209 and that such harm will translate into a negative marginal effect on the 
output of creative works.210  If, and only if, both reduction in market value and reduction in 
incentives are established by the copyright owner, should courts then balance the harm to the 
copyright owner with the public’s interest in allowing the use to continue nonetheless.211  
Some clue as to the extent of particularization required by Lunney’s approach is 
found in his examples. Lunney illustrates the logic of his cost-benefit analysis through a 
detailed analysis of the economics of allowing unauthorized time-shifting of broadcast 
television through digital video recorders.212  Lunney’s intricate cost-benefit analysis of time-
shifting would require a court to determine, (i) the correlation between advertising and 
consumer spending, (ii) the ratio of advertising to content on broadcast television, (iii) the 
extent to which consumer exposure to advertising has diminishing returns, (iv) the average 
consumer’s reduced consumption of advertising, and (v) the extent to which other forms of 
broadcast based advertising, such as product placement, would counteract the effect of 
commercial skipping DVRs.213   
A highly specific cost-benefit analysis of the economic efficiency of granting (or 
denying) fair use appears to be both fundamentally impractical and inherently speculative. 
These concerns are addressed in turn.  
                                                 
209 Lunney, Sony Revisited, supra note 145, at 1000. 
210 Id., at 1023. 
211 Id. 
212 Id., at 1000 – 1014.   
213 This fifth consideration was not mentioned by Lunney, which further illustrates the difficulty of the 
task he envisages. See Lunney, Sony Revisited, supra note 145. 
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First, although courts are capable of deciding complex questions of fact and weighing 
expert testimony across a whole range of issues, the notion that a highly specified cost-
benefit analysis would be an efficient use of scarce judicial resources strains credibility.  The 
extensive industry surveys and lengthy economists’ briefs required to answer such questions 
are likely to exceed the patience of most courts and the resources of most parties.  As many 
fair use cases involve new technologies, courts should be particularly “mindful of the 
limitations facing judges where matters of technology are concerned.” 214 
Second, finding the optimum level of copyright scope for any given market is 
inherently speculative.  For example, a court asked to rule against the use of lengthy plot 
summaries in film reviews would have to consider the following: (i) the potential increase in 
revenue to the copyright holder from licensed plot summaries; (ii) the effect of that potential 
increase in revenue on the production of films; (iii) the potential decrease or increase in the 
public’s enjoyment of film reviews; and (iv) the likely effect on the public’s demand for films.  
As with Lunney’s own example of the DVR, the net welfare consequences are extremely 
uncertain and could easily tip one way or the other based on minor changes in the court’s 
underlying assumptions. 
Adding to this impracticality is the possibility of unforeseen interactions between 
variables.  The peculiar economics of intellectual and creative output may result in 
unauthorized uses actually benefiting copyright owners,215 in spite of vigorous protestations 
to the contrary.  An unauthorized use might expand the market for the original work and 
                                                 
214 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2792 (2005) (Justice Breyer concurring). 
(“Judges have no specialized technical ability to answer questions about present or future technological 
feasibilility or commercial viability where technology professionals, engineers, and venture capitalists themselves 
may radically disagree and where answers may differ depending upon whether one focuses upon the time of 
product development or the time of distribution.”) 
215 Gregory M. Duhl gives three examples of this perverse effect: unauthorized fan comics in Japan, 
unauthorized home video recording, and unauthorized music sampling. See Gregory M. Duhl, Old Lyrics, Knock-
Off Videos, And Copycat Comic Books: The Fourth Fair Use Factor In U.S. Copyright Law, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 665, 
668. (2004). 
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thus benefit the copyright owner. The Sony decision provides the paradigm example: in 1981 
the head of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) told Congress that “the 
VCR is to the American film producer and the American public as the Boston strangler is to 
the woman home alone.”216  And yet, MPAA members now earn a significant proportion of 
their revenues from VCR sales and DVD sales;217 the Boston strangler was never so 
generous. The Supreme Court’s willingness to speculate as to the potential market expansive 
effects of unauthorized uses in what was widely perceived as a test case, does not itself 
suggest that courts should routinely engage in this kind of speculation, or that similar cases 
should be reargued whenever there is a minor change in the underlying economics of the 
broadcast industry (such as a demographic shift) or the technology of home recording (such 
as a faster fast-forward button).  
Of course, impracticality is not necessarily fatal to a proposed legal reform; the 
suggested course of action can be taken as aspirational, not literal. Fisher argues that courts 
would benefit from implementing his proposed cost-benefit analysis in spite of its practical 
limitations.  According to Fisher, the method has value as a means through which courts 
might at least “increase allocative efficiency, if not to maximize it.”218  However, a highly 
specified cost-benefit analysis of the merits of fair use is not simply an unrealistic ideal, it is 
fundamentally ill-conceived. The root of the problem is that a highly specified cost-benefit 
analysis trades doctrinal efficiency for the promise of more perfect allocative efficiency, a 
promise that is in most cases simply illusory.   
                                                 
216 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, 
H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong, 2d Sess. 5 (1982) (statement of Jack Valenti, President, Motion 
Picture Association of America). 
217 According to the MPAA, there was a $22 Billion market for DVDs and VHS tapes in the U.S. 
alone in 2002. See, Motion Picture Association of America, 2003 Piracy Fact Sheets: US Overview, available at 
http://www.mpaa.org/PiracyFactSheets/PiracyFactSheetUS.pdf. 
218 Fisher, supra note 145, at 1719.  
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In addition to its practical limitations in any given case, the benefits of a highly 
specified cost-benefit approach to fair use are almost certainly outweighed by its broader 
effects on the copyright system. First, an individuated cost-benefit analysis is inconsistent 
with the general universality of the copyright law. Copyright vests equally in grocery lists and 
love letters, which do not depend on copyright’s incentives for their production and 
distribution, as well as novels and encyclopedias, which typically do.  The extent of copyright 
protection does vary from work to work, because of the requirements of the idea-expression 
distinction, but this modification is independent of any assessment of the need for 
incentive.219  Asking courts to fine-tune copyright protection based on an assessment of the 
author’s need for incentive runs contrary to the universalism of the current copyright system.  
As the Fifth Circuit held in Mitchell Brothers: 
Congress has concluded that the constitutional purpose of its copyright power, to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, is best served by allowing all 
creative works (in a copyrightable format) to be accorded copyright protection 
regardless of subject matter or content, trusting to the public taste to reward creators 
of useful works and to deny creators of useless works any reward. 220 
 
Indeed, the more case-specific rules become, the less point there is to having a 
copyright system at all. As Louis Kaplow observed in relation to the intersection between 
antitrust law and patent law:  
In theory, direct reward systems are preferable because they avoid the monopoly 
costs associated with a general patent system. A central reason for reliance on a 
patent system is that it is thought to be too difficult to determine the appropriate 
level of reward fairly and accurately on a case-by-case basis. 221 
 
                                                 
219 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (Copyright in a factual 
compilation is thin. Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to use the facts 
contained in another's publication to aid in preparing a competing work, so long as the competing work does 
not feature the same selection and arrangement.) 
220 Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1979) (quotes 
omitted).  
221 Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1844 (1984). 
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The same reasoning applies to copyright and fair use. The cost-benefit logic suggests 
that, in every single case or at least in a highly specified subset of cases, judges should 
attempt to perfectly balance the author’s incentive requirements with the public benefits of 
increased access.  In any individual case, this analysis is unlikely to be able to be properly 
undertaken by any judge. In the aggregate, if this approach were taken, any welfare gains 
achieved by fine-tuning copyright scope would be outweighed by the losses in doctrinal 
efficiency.  Doctrinal efficiency in copyright necessitates both under-protection and over-
protection; consequently, even copyright pessimists must endure some measure of optimism 
for the sake of an efficient universal system.  In terms of the copyright system generally, 
highly specified cost-benefit judging would make copyright legislation redundant. Indeed, the 
logical conclusion of the cost-benefit approach is that legislative guidance on copyright law 
should be entirely replaced by individually crafted judicial determinations of rights. 
Second, any benefits of applying a cost-benefit approach to fair use in individual 
cases would also be outweighed by its broader effects on the copyright system, because the 
narrow fact findings of such cases would have little or no value as precedent.  In our 
common law judicial system, litigation has both a private and public benefit: it resolves 
disputes between the parties and develops and/or clarifies the law for the benefit of all 
society.222  If fair use decisions were arrived at by comparing the precise social value of 
additional authorship resulting from prohibiting an unauthorized use against the social value 
of allowing the unauthorized use to continue, subsequent cases with similar facts could be 
decided differently based only on esoteric questions of valuation or minor changes in the 
underlying markets.  The cost benefit approach invites the losing plaintiffs in the Sony case to 
start litigation all over again in response to demographic changes or shifts in consumer tastes.  
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Any change in these factors could tip the balance of competing interests between the 
copyright owners and the public, even though none of them relate to the actions of VCR 
manufacturers. 
The chilling effect of law without significant precedent value poses a significant 
threat to continued innovation in technologies that have both infringing and non-infringing 
uses and to free expression more generally. The entire purpose of the staple article of 
commerce doctrine applied in Sony is to provide ex ante certainty to those who develop new 
products.223 The aim of the staple article of commerce doctrine is clearly undermined if the 
results of litigated cases are so easily disturbed as the logic of a cost benefit analysis implies. 
As Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Grokster explains, without the ability to rely on the 
existence of a substantial non-infringing use:  
Inventors and entrepreneurs (in the garage, the dorm room, the corporate lab, or the 
boardroom) would have to fear (and in many cases endure) costly and extensive trials 
when they create, produce, or distribute the sort of information technology that can 
be used for copyright infringement. They would often be left guessing as to how a 
court, upon later review of the product and its uses, would decide when necessarily 
rough estimates amounted to sufficient evidence. They would have no way to predict 
how courts would weigh the respective values of infringing and noninfringing uses; 
determine the efficiency and advisability of technological changes; or assess a 
product's potential future markets. The price of a wrong guess -- even if it involves a 
good-faith effort to assess technical and commercial viability -- could be large 
statutory damages (not less than $ 750 and up to $ 30,000 per infringed work). 17 
U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). The additional risk and uncertainty would mean a consequent 
additional chill of technological development.224 
 
The Supreme Court’s emphasis on a case-by-case approach to fair use does not 
suggest that all traces of precedent should be removed from fair use jurisprudence.225  
                                                 
223 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2791 (2005) (Justice Breyer concurring). 
224 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2793 (U.S. 2005). 
225 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577, 581 (1994) (The task is not to be simplified with 
bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.); Harper & Row, 
471 U.S. 549, 561, 597; Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 495 (1984). 
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Indeed, the Court has crafted broad fair use exemptions for both parody and criticism which 
are entirely untethered to a cost benefit analysis. As the Court clearly stated in Campbell:  
[T]here is no protectable derivative market for criticism. The market for potential 
derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general 
develop or license others to develop. Yet the unlikelihood that creators of 
imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions 
removes such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market.226 
 
Congress has clearly indicated that the courts should continue to develop the fair use 
doctrine through the common law.227 The common law requires the development of 
principles, not the mere determination of cases. Decided cases should offer some guidance to 
copyright owners and members of the public alike, as to which activities are likely to be 
infringing and which are not.   
Doctrinal efficiency is far more than just a question of the frequency of litigation.  
Reliance on the judicial process (or an administrative process) magnifies the level of 
uncertainty faced by all potential parties and multiplies opportunities for strategic behavior.228 
As I have suggested elsewhere, it may be the case that the uncertainty costs of a flexible fair 
use doctrine are worth the benefits,229 but it would still be wise to try to keep those costs 
contained.  In its paradigm form, the cost-benefit approach treats welfare as purely 
determined by the sum of costs and benefits in individual cases, without regard to either the 
costs of state action or the likely multiplication of cases and threats of litigation.  
                                                 
226 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994). Admittedly, the clarity of this statement is 
somewhat diminished by the Court’s insistence that the adjudication of fair use cases is “not to be simplified 
with bright-line rules.” Id. at 277.  
227 In enacting 17 U.S.C. § 107, Congress meant to restate existing judicial doctrine of fair use, not to 
change, narrow, or enlarge doctrine in any way, and intended that courts continue common law tradition of fair-
use adjudication. See, Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
228 See Part II. C., supra. 
229 Sag, supra note 63. 
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3. Variation in the scope-welfare relationship 
The third metric that can be used to assess law and economics doctrinal 
recommendations focuses on the variation and complexity of the scope-welfare relationship. 
It asks whether the recommended application is feasible in light of the expectation that there 
will be substantial variation, both within and between industries, in the welfare-scope 
relationship.  The paradigm case by case cost-benefit analysis clearly addresses the need to 
account for variation in the scope-welfare relationship, but it must be rejected under the 
doctrinal efficiency criteria for the reasons given above.  A more broadly based cost benefit 
approach to fair use, one that varied industry by industry, as opposed to case by case, avoids 
most of the gross doctrinal inefficiency of the paradigm model but necessarily trades off 
greater  efficiency for a less nuanced account of variation in the welfare-scope relationship.  
Arguably, the paradigm case is just an idealization, and is not meant to be taken 
literally. However, even if we assume that a cost-benefit approach should be applied in a 
more general fashion, to classes of works, rather than individual works,230 we are still left with 
the problem of deciding where to draw the boundaries between classes.   
As briefly discussed in Part II, although tailoring specific doctrines to the need for 
incentives in particular industries may be desirable in theory, its application is hazardous. 
There are at least five hazards worth exploring: 
(1)  Industries are constantly evolving, thus industry definitions are inherently 
fluid and resist legal definition; 
(2)  Legal proceedings may become dominated by questions of taxonomy as the 
parties lobby for competing industry definitions; 
                                                 
230 Loren seems to indicate the former, Lunney the later. See Loren, supra note 147, at __; Lunney, 
Sony Revisited, supra note 145. 
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(3)  Intra-industry variation may be just as significant as inter-industry variation 
depending on the level of generality of the industry definition used; 
(4)  Inter-industry effects are likely to be ambiguous;  
(5) Industry tailoring may have negative effects on the overall political economy 
of copyright law. 
This is not to suggest that industry tailoring is never appropriate, rather that its feasibility 
must be carefully considered. However, an industry tailoring approach to the fair use 
doctrine seems particularly unworkable for all of the reasons given above.  
The first three hazards relate to the difficulty of defining exactly where one industry 
stops and another begins. Although a number of authors have recommended a status driven 
approach to fair use, one that preferences educators, scientists and news reporters,231 it is by 
no means clear what the boundaries of any of these classes might be.  
The broader the industry definition used, the more likely it is that intra-industry 
variation be as significant as the inter-industry variation which supposedly justified a tailored 
approach to fair use. But even within a fairly narrow industry definition, such as computer 
software, incentive effects and requirements for copyright protection can differ. As Yochai 
Benkler argues, expansionist intellectual property regimes tend to favor some producers and 
disfavor others, depending on their information production strategy.232  Open source 
software and commercial software often compete side by side in the market place, but their 
production strategies are radically different.  So in spite of being in the same industry, 
information producers may well differ in their reliance on direct appropriation of their 
information outputs, they will be differently affected by an expansion of intellectual property 
                                                 
231 See, e.g. Fisher, supra note 145, at 1744. 
232 Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information Production, 22 INT. REV. OF LAW 
AND ECON. 81 (2002). 
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rights. The more a producer relies on direct appropriation of its information outputs, the 
more likely it is to find that the increased costs of greater copyright scope are matched by 
increased revenues.233  In contrast, information production strategies that rely on indirect 
appropriation and non-monetary gains are likely to be prejudiced by an increase in copyright 
scope.     
The fourth consideration is that even if a court was presented with sufficient 
evidence to determine the optimal level of copyright scope for a particular market, it would 
then have to consider how changes in one market might distort other markets.  For example, 
finding the optimum trade-off between increasing incentives and reducing the cost of 
expression for a particular genre of novels might distort the downstream market for screen-
plays in the same genre, some of which are derived from novels and some of which are not.  
However well intended, tilting the scales of copyright in one market is likely to have 
unintended consequences and potential multiplier effects in other markets.  These judgments 
need to be based on sound theoretical approaches and/or broad based empirical evidence, 
not merely a cost-benefit analysis of one narrow case or class of cases. 
The fifth consideration is that an industry level cost-benefit analysis would 
significantly expand opportunities for rent seeking in copyright law.  If judges explicitly craft 
rules to apply differently to particular industries, the ability of those industries to lobby 
Congress for particularized benefits will only increase. While there are numerous examples of 
special interest rent seeking in the current copyright law, this type of particularism is limited 
by the universalism of copyright. As such, industry based cost-benefit rules may well subvert 
the aims of their proponents.234   
                                                 
233 Id., at 83. 
234 Dan Burk and Mark Lemley raise a similar concern with respect to industry differentiation in patent 
law. Although Burk and Lemley have advocated tailoring patent protection to the needs of specific industries in 
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4. Overall assessment of the cost benefit approach to fair use  
In its paradigm form, the cost benefit approach to fair use fails to account for the 
high costs and speculative benefits of asking judges to fine tune the scope of copyright. 
Various applications of the market failure approach have been rightly criticized for simply 
presuming the efficiency of private ordering without any serious empirical or theoretical 
inquiry.235 The opposite criticism can be leveled at the cost-benefit approach to fair use. The 
implicit assumption of the cost benefit approach to fair use is that every litigated fair use case 
represents a failure of private ordering and that such failures will continue even after judicial 
resolution of like cases. The cost-benefit approach is also limited by its failure to recognize 
the significance of the significant costs associated with its (arguably futile) pursuit of more 
perfect allocative efficiency. 
Is there an alternative? An industry based cost-benefit analysis of fair use incorrectly 
focuses on the status of the defendant, rather than the nature of her conduct. An alternative 
approach to fair use that may meet many of the objectives of the cost benefit approach is to 
concentrate on identifying situations in which fair use should be presumed. Such an 
approach is consistent with the current doctrinal framework of fair use, can be incorporated 
into the general market failure framework and lends itself to the application of economic 
analysis in the form of game theory and many other analytical tool-sets. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
light of industry based variation in economic evidence, patent doctrine, and legal theory, they concede that there 
are a number of risks inherent in such a technology-specific approach. In particular, they acknowledge because 
of “concerns about rent seeking and the inability of industry-specific statutes to respond to changing 
circumstances, … we should not jettison our nominally uniform patent system in favor of specific statutes that 
protect particular industries.” Burk and Lemley, supra note 123, 1578-79.  However, as Polk Wagner points out, 
these political economy concerns should not be confined to legislative particularism. R. Polk Wagner, Exactly 
Backwards: Exceptionalism and the Federal Circuit, 54 Case W. Res. 749, 755 (2004). 
235 See Cohen, supra note 8, at 465 (criticizing the assumptions of those who predict the irrelevance of 
fair use in cyberspace as unproven and unjustified in the case of creative and informational works.) 
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CONCLUSION  
The traditional single variable analysis of the welfare effects of copyright protection is 
bedeviled by empirical uncertainty as to the optimum level of that protection.  The traditional 
model is a useful tool for thinking about the efficiency of copyright as a whole, but as a 
launching pad for recommendations about individual copyright doctrines, it is more limited. 
Conclusions as to optimum copyright protection do not directly translate into doctrinal 
recommendations, because any given level of copyright protection can be engineered 
through an infinite number of combinations of copyright protection’s constituent variables – 
copyright scope and copyright duration.  
This article has suggested two extensions of the traditional model that address this 
limitation. The first extension is to simply set aside the issue of duration and focus on 
copyright scope. This is useful for analyzing specific copyright doctrines, and has very little 
distorting effect because of the extraordinary length of modern copyright terms. The second 
extension of the traditional model is to relax the assumption that there are no differences 
between the welfare effects of different combinations of doctrinal settings that result in the 
same level of copyright scope. This article formalized the notion of doctrinal efficiency as 
concept separate from, but ultimately related to, the ideal extent of copyright scope.  
Building on both of these extensions to the traditional model, this article explored the 
relationship between copyright scope and welfare from a theoretical perspective to develop a 
framework for evaluating specific doctrinal recommendations in copyright law. This analysis 
leads to four conclusions, three of which in turn provide useful metrics or benchmarks for 
assessing doctrinal recommendations. The first (by no means novel) conclusion is that the 
ideal extent of copyright scope must be both more than nothing, and less than everything.  
The more tractable implications of the theoretical exploration of the relationship between 
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copyright scope and welfare are: (1) the efficiency of private ordering is the key determinant 
of the ideal level of copyright scope; (2) the complexity of the welfare-scope relationship is 
such that we are unlikely to be able to ascertain a generalizable optimal level of copyright 
scope – the relationship will clearly be subject to substantial variation, both within and 
between industries; (3) doctrinal recommendations which aim to optimize copyright scope in 
the abstract but do not account for the effect of a doctrinal change on transaction costs or 
uncertainty are necessarily incomplete.   
This article bridges the gap between the traditional law and economics of copyright 
and specific doctrinal analysis by applying the above conclusions as metrics for assessing 
doctrinal proposals. The metrics do not definitively determine which doctrinal proposals are 
either efficient or normatively desirable, but they are useful in both filtering out some ill-
conceived recommendations, and identifying areas for improvement in others.  The 
application of these metrics to the predominant law and economics theories of fair use 
illustrates the approach and its potential. This metric driven analysis demonstrates the general 
robustness of the market failure approach to fair use and the relative frailty of the competing 
cost benefit approach. Importantly, the application of the metrics also indicates how the 
market failure approach can be improved.  
This article’s main substantive recommendation with respect to the fair use doctrine 
is that the market failure approach should be modified to incorporate a more discerning basis 
for allocating the burden of proof. One method of doing this is to apply some of the 
observations from game theory, behavioral economics and industrial organization to identify 
scenarios where the market is likely to fail, or scenarios in which the potential consequences 
of market failure justify a presumption that errs in favor of finding fair use. This approach is 
preferable to an industry tailored cost benefit approach because it asks courts to focus on the 
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nature of the defendant’s conduct, not her broader status or affiliation. Courts should 
continue to develop the common law of fair use and attempt to identify situations in which 
the failure of the market for permissions should be presumed.  Courts already appear to 
make this presumption with respect to parody, criticism, review, trivial quotation and the 
reverse engineering of computer software. This situational approach preserves the flexibility 
of the common law, is easily incorporated into a market failure framework, and lends itself to 
the application of sophisticated economic analysis in a form that courts can actually use. 
The applicability of the metrics developed in this article is by no means limited to fair 
use. Another significant issue in copyright that remains unresolved is the extent of secondary 
liability for infringement and the correct application of the Sony standard with respect to 
substantial non-infringing use.236 A number of commentators have suggested reformulating 
the law of secondary liability to hold technology providers liable for failure to take reasonable 
steps to prevent infringing uses of their products or services. 237 A cost benefit analysis 
suggests that liability should extend up to the point that the technology provider’s cost of 
prevention equals the social benefit of reducing copyright infringement.238  This is not the 
place to critique this notion in detail, suffice to say that the uncertainty such a rule would 
create in the boardrooms of Silicon Valley would be immense.239  
                                                 
236 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2778 (U.S. 2005) The opinion of the Court 
was confined to the issue of secondary liability through active inducement, and “did not revisit Sony further … 
to add a more quantified description of the point of balance between protection and commerce when liability 
rests solely on distribution with knowledge that unlawful use will occur.”  
237 See, Douglas Lichtman and William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An Economic 
Perspective, 16 HARV. J. LAW & TEC 395, 404-05 (2003); Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of America 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc. in the Age of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 910-11 (2004). See also In re 
Aimster Copyright Litigation. 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003) (“When a supplier is offering a product or 
service that has noninfringing as well as infringing uses, some estimate of the respective magnitudes of these 
uses is necessary for a finding of contributory infringement.”)  
238 Id.  
239 A point forcefully made by Justice Breyer in his concurring opinion in Grokster. MGM Studios Inc. 
v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2792-2793 (U.S. 2005) (Increasing the burden on defendants “would 
doubtless make life easier for copyrightholder plaintiffs. But it would simultaneously increase the legal 
uncertainty that surrounds the creation or development of a new technology capable of being put to infringing 
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The point of raising this example is not to debate its merits, but rather to show that 
the methodology developed in this article has broad application. By revising and extending 
the traditional model of the welfare effects of copyright to produce applicable metrics, this 
article translates abstract economic theory into concrete recommendations for individual 
copyright doctrines.  
                                                                                                                                                  
uses. Inventors and entrepreneurs (in the garage, the dorm room, the corporate lab, or the boardroom) would 
have to fear (and in many cases endure) costly and extensive trials when they create, produce, or distribute the 
sort of information technology that can be used for copyright infringement.”) 
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